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Abstract
This paper uses an axiomatic foundation to create a new measure for the cost of learning that allows for
multiple perceptual distances in a single choice environment so that some events can be harder to differentiate
between than others. The new measure maintains the tractability of Shannon’s classic measure but produces
richer choice predictions and identifies a new form of informational bias significant for welfare and counterfactual
analysis. The model also provides a new foundation for non-compensatory behavior, connecting the literatures
on rational inattention and heuristic style choice rules.1
1 Introduction
In many choice environments it is costly for agents to obtain information about the options that they face.
Understanding how agents learn in such environments is crucial because partially informed choices have serious
implications for revealed preference analysis, which makes welfare and counterfacutal analysis more difficult.
The standard technique for quantifying the cost of learning in models of rational inattention (RI) is Shannon
Entropy (Sims, 2003). Shannon Entropy has an axiomatic foundation, is grounded in the optimal coding of
information, and provides a tractable and flexible framework with which to study agent behavior (Shannon,
1948).
While Shannon Entropy has proven to be a valuable tool, it is not without limitations. It is natural to
think that it should be more difficult to differentiate between outcomes that are more similar. Differentiating
between two types of black tea, for instance, should be more difficult than differentiating between water and
coffee. Shannon Entropy, however, does not allow for different outcomes to be more or less similar than each
other. Without a mechanism to allow for what is referred to in the literature as ‘perceptual distance,’2 the choice
1Special thanks to Rahul Deb for all of the support. I would also like to thank Yoram Halevy, Marcin Peski, Carolyn Pitchik, and
Colin Stewart, for their helpful advice.
2If two outcomes are more similar it is said that they have less perceptual distance between them.
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behavior predicted by Shannon Entropy can differ from observed behavior, as is demonstrated by Example 1 in
Section 2.1, which can limit the effectiveness of Shannon Entropy in empirical settings.
This paper proposes five axioms that focus on the cost of asking simple questions, questions that can be
represented by partitions of the outcome space. These intuitive axioms are used to create a new measure for the
cost of learning that we call Multisource Shannon Entropy (MSSE). MSSE features perceptual distance, maintains
the desired tractability and flexibility of Shannon’s classic measure when incorporated into a model of RI, and
predicts behavioral patterns that have been identified as problematic for Shannon Entropy.
MSSE also identifies a previously undiscovered informational bias in random utility (RU) models that
should be considered a natural consequence of different perceptual distances in the same choice environment, as
is demonstrated by Example 2 in Section 2.2. While other papers study measures of information that feature
perceptual distance (e.g., He´bert & Woodford, 2017), this paper is the first to identify informational biases in RU
models generated by the presence of different perceptual distances in the same choice environment. Unlike the
informational bias identified with Shannon Entropy, this type of informational bias cannot be identified in the
unconditional choice probabilities of the agent, and thus presents a new challenge for welfare and counterfactual
analysis.
Even though it is based on intuitive axioms, MSSE also creates a new foundation for ‘non-compensatory’
behavior, whereby changing the characteristics of an option in a fashion that makes it more valuable to the agent,
ceteris paribus, can result in a lower chance of the agent selecting it. This type of behavior can seem irrational,
but is actually fairly pervasive, particularly in the marketing literature. Shannon Entropy does not predict non-
compensatory beavior, and thus MSSE provides a new tool for studying a phenomena that is significant due to
the challenges it creates for revealed preference analysis.
1.1 Literature Review
Shannon Entropy has been used in several contexts to demonstrate informational biases in RU models.
Mateˇjka and McKay (2015) use Shannon Entropy in a model of RI to demonstrate the potential for informational
biases in multinomial logit, while Steiner, Stewart, and Mateˇjka (2017) use Shannon Entropy in a model of RI
to demonstrate the potential for a similar bias in dynamic logit. These results are significant for those who wish
to fit RU models because, while observational data may coincide with the assumptions of a fitted RU model,
informational biases can potentially invalidate counterfactual and welfare analysis, two common goals of such a
fitting.
The Shannon RI model has also led to a number of predictive successes. Acharya and Wee (2019) show
that using Shannon Entropy to model firms as rationally inattentive results in a better fitting of the labour
market dynamics after the great depression. Dasgupta and Mondria (2018) show that using Shannon Entropy
to model importers as rationally inattentive results in novel predictions that are supported by trade data.
Ambuehl, Ockenfels, and Stewart (2019) experimentally verify predictions of Shannon Entropy in environments
where agents are rationally inattentive to the consequences of participating in different transactions.
Perhaps as a response to the success Shannon Entropy has enjoyed, several recent papers have noted
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that Shannon Entropy may be a poor measure of the cost of acquiring information in some environments
(Caplin, Dean, & Leahy, 2017; Morris & Yang, 2016) because it lacks what is called “perceptual distance” (Caplin et al.,
2017, p. 39). As was alluded to previously, these papers argue that (i) more similar outcomes (outcomes that
have less perceptual distance between them) should be more difficult to differentiate between, and (ii) when this
property is missing, predicted behavior can differ signficantly from the type of behavior that it would seem natural
to expect (Morris & Yang, 2016).
To better understand the relationship between the cost of learning and agent behavior, a number of papers
have studied axiomatic models of rational inattention. Different papers, however, choose to focus their axioms on
different aspects of the choice environment. Caplin et al. (2017), for instance, develop axioms that focus on the
choice behavior of an agent after they expend effort to learn about the state of the world. In contrast, de Oliveira
(2014) and de Oliveira, Denti, Mihm, and Ozbek (2017) develop axioms that focus on an agent’s preferences over
choice menus before they expend effort to learn about the state of the world. Broadly, these papers aim to
understand what implications rational agent behavior has for the form of information cost functions.
Closer in nature to the work done in this paper, Pomatto, Strack, and Tamuz (2019) develop axioms that
focus directly on the costs of information. Axioms that focus on costs of information are interesting because
intuitive properties for costs of information can lead to unintuitive agent behavior that is compelling given real-
world observations (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), but is often mistaken for irrational. This type of behavior is
missed when axioms that appear rational are imposed on behavior. The fact that the measure of uncertainty
developed in this paper predicts non-compensatory behavior, as was mentioned, raises important questions for
welfare and counterfactual analysis, making effective policy design more challenging.
Unlike the work of Pomatto et al. (2019), which features axioms that are concerned with probabilistic
experiments that can result in different outcomes in the same state of the world, this paper’s axioms are concerned
with deterministic experiments (questions) that always result in the same outcome in a given state of the world.
Further, Pomatto et al. (2019) imposes a type of constant marginal cost of information that, interestingly enough,
contradicts the form of constant marginal cost assumed in this paper. In their paper, it is assumed that the cost
of performing two experiments is the sum of the costs of the individual experiments, which is part of what they
mean by constant marginal cost. In this paper, the cost of answering two questions can be less than the sum of
their individual costs because learning from one question can help make the other less costly, if for instance, the
answer to one question rules out one of the potential events being differentiated between by the answer to the
other question. The measure of uncertainty produced in this paper thus has diminishing marginal costs when
‘marginal cost’ is interpreted as in Pomatto et al. (2019), as is true with Shannon’s standard measure. The form
of constant marginal cost in this paper, outlined in Axiom 1, allows for learning from one question to reduce the
cost of answering future questions, and instead requires that the cost only depend on the agent’s beliefs when the
question is answered, and not on the number of questions that have already been answered.
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1.2 Organization of Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces Shannon Entropy, discusses models
of RI, and provides motivating examples. Section 3 proposes five new axioms, and uses them to develop a more
flexible cost of acquiring information, MSSE, which features perceptual distance. Section 4 uses MSSE as a
benchmark with which to price inattentive information strategies in a model of RI, and discusses the resultant
agent behavior. Section 5 discusses the RU model that is analogous to the agent behavior found in Section 4, and
revisits the motivating examples from Section 2.1 and Section 2.2. Section 6 discusses the implications of RI with
MSSE for the formation of consideration sets and non-compensatory behavior. Section 7 discusses the shortfalls
of MSSE, and how it could likely be rejected experimentally. Section 8 concludes.
2 Rational Inattention and Shannon Entropy
Economic agents frequently face choice environments that feature uncertainty about payoffs. In such
environments, agents must decide how much information to acquire before choosing between available options.
Models of Rational Inattention (RI) study cost functions for information, and how the trade-off agents face
between the quality of information and the cost of learning affects their choice behavior.
In the RI literature, learning by the agent is typically modelled as the choice of a signal structure. The
agent chooses the probability of receiving different signals in different states of the world. Receiving a signal
updates the agent’s belief about the state of the world, giving them a more informed posterior belief. More
informative signal structures are more costly for the agent, but allow them to make a more informed decision
about which option to select.
Suppose that the uncertainty faced by the agent is described by the measurable space (Ω, F), where Ω is
the finite set of possible states of the world (the outcome space), and F is the set of events (the power set of
Ω). The agent is assumed to have a prior distribution, µ : F → [0, 1], over the potential states of the world.
Suppose that an agent who has stopped learning must make a selection from a set of options, denoted
N = {1, . . . , N}. Each option, n ∈ N , in each state of the world, ω ∈ Ω, has a value to the agent vn(ω).
The agent’s problem is to maximize the expected value of the selected option less the cost of learning.
They do this by choosing an information strategy F (s, ω) ∈ ∆(RN ×Ω), which is a joint distribution between
s, the N dimensional observed signal, and the states of the world.3 The only restriction on the information
strategy is that the marginal, F (ω) : F → R+, must equal the prior µ. Alternatively, an agent can select a
probability measure F (s|ω) : RN → R+ for each ω ∈ Ω, which, combined with µ, determine both F (s, ω) and
the posterior F (ω|s). It is a property of the cost function for information derived in this paper, as is true with
Shannon Entropy, that if F (s, ω) is optimal then the agent is done learning after a single signal s. After the signal
is realized, the agent simply picks the action with the highest expected value:
a(s) = argmax
n∈N
EF (ω|s)[vn(ω)].
3The decision to allow s to be N dimensional is rather arbitrary. This is a much richer signal space than is required in practice.
We show later that s only need be one dimensional in our setting.
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Ignoring the cost of learning momentarily, the value to the agent of receiving a signal s, which induces posterior
F (ω|s), is then:
V (s) = max
n∈N
EF (ω|s)[vn(ω)].
Let the expected cost of a particular information strategy, given the agent’s prior, be denotedC(F (s, ω), µ).
We describe the form of this cost function in Section 4. The agent’s problem can thus be written:
max
F∈∆(RN×Ω)
∑
ω∈Ω
∫
s
V (s)F (ds|ω)µ(ω)−C(F (s, ω), µ),
such that ∀ω ∈ Ω :
∫
s
F (ds, ω) = µ(ω).
The choice behavior the agent exhibits depends on the cost function for information. Shannon Entropy is
a measure of uncertainty with an axiomatic foundation that can be used to assign costs to information. If we are
given a partition of the possible states of the world P = {A1, . . . , Am}, and probability measure µ over these
events, the uncertainty about which event has occurred, as measured by Shannon Entropy, is defined:4
H(P , µ) = −
m∑
i=1
µ(Ai) log(µ(Ai)). (1)
The convention used here is to set 0 log(0) = 0.
If an agent has prior µ about the state of the world, and their beliefs are updated to the posterior µ(·|s)
after they receive a signal s , then there is a change in the uncertainty as measured by Shannon Entropy. When
Shannon Entropy is used in models of RI, the cost of an information strategy F (s, ω) is measured as the expected
reduction in Shannon Entropy:
E
[
H(P , µ)−H(P , µ(·|s))
]
,
where P = {{ω1}, {ω2}, . . . , {ωn}}. Bayes rule, and the nature of Shannon Entropy, guarantee that every
potential information strategy of the agent has a weakly positive cost.
2.1 Example 1: Perceptual Distance and Problems with Predictions
Caplin et al. (2017, p. 19) show that Shannon Entropy results in choice behavior that satisfies “invariance
under compression.” That is, when Shannon Entropy is used to measure information, if there are two states of
the world, ω1 and ω2, across which payoffs are identical for each option (vn(ω1) = vn(ω2) ∀n), then the chance
of each option being selected is the same in ω1 and ω2. The invariance under compression that is predicted by
Shannon Entropy is, unfortunately, not found in many settings, as is shown by the work of Dean and Neligh
(2018). The intuition for why invariance under compression may not be present in every choice environment is
demonstrated by the following example.
Consider an environment where an agent is faced with a screen that shows 100 balls, each of which is either
4This measure is only unique up to a positive multiplier.
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Table 1: Example 1
State: ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4
Balls in State: 60 Blue & 40 Red 51 Blue & 49 Red 49 Blue & 51 Red 40 Blue & 60 Red
Probability of State: 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
Value of selecting option 1: y y -y -y
Value of selecting option 2: 0 0 0 0
red or blue. The agent is offered a prize that they may either accept (option 1), or reject to get a payoff of zero
(option 2). The agent is told that if the majority of the balls on the screen are blue then the prize is y ∈ R++,
and if the majority of the balls on the screen are red then the prize is −y. Suppose further that the agent is also
told that there is a 1/4 chance of four different states of the world in which there are either 40, 49, 51, or 60 red
balls, as is described in Table 1.
A model of RI that employs Shannon Entropy, and results in invariance under compression, predicts that
the agent has the same chance of selecting option 1 when there are 40 red balls as when there are 49 red balls,
and that the agent has the same chance of selecting option 1 when there are 60 red balls as when there are 51 red
balls. This predicted behavior is not intuitive because it should be easier for the agent to differentiate between
the states that are more different (40 versus 60 red balls) than the states that are more similar (49 versus 51 red
balls). One should instead expect that the chance that option 1 is selected is decreasing in the number of red
balls, as is demonstrated by the experiments of Dean and Neligh (2018), because it should be easier to determine
which color of ball constitutes the majority the more of that color ball there are.
Why does Shannon Entropy impose this type of behavior? In short, Shannon Entropy results in invariance
under compression because of Shannon’s third axiom (Shannon, 1948), which can be found in Appendix 4. In
the context of Example 1, let P = {{ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}, {ω4}}, and P˜ = {{ω1 ∪ ω2}, {ω3 ∪ ω4}}, be two partitions
of the outcome space. Shannon’s third axiom requires that total uncertainty about the state of the world, which
is the uncertainty about which event in P has occurred, be equal to the uncertainty about which event in P˜ has
occurred, plus the expected amount of uncertainty that remains about which event in P has occurred after we
have learned which event in P˜ has occurred. This equality means that the reduction in uncertainty caused by a
signal is equal to the reduction in uncertainty about which event in P˜ has occurred, plus the expected reduction
in uncertainty about which event in P has occurred given which event in P˜ has occurred.
The agent is only concerned with which event in P˜ has occurred, as this fully determines payoffs. Given
which event in P˜ has occurred, the agent does not care which event in P has occurred. If agent behavior is
different in ω1 compared to ω2, or ω3 compared to ω4, so that their behavior does not satisfy invariance under
compression, then the agent is, to an extent, differentiating between these states, and paying for information that
does not benefit them, and their information strategy is thus not optimal.
While other information cost functions do not require that choice behavior satisfies invariance under com-
pression (Caplin et al., 2017; Morris & Yang, 2016), they lack the tractability and flexibility of Shannon Entropy,5
which limits the potential for their application. This has led to the following open question: “what workable al-
ternative models allow for the complex behavioral patterns identified in practice?” (Caplin et al., 2017, p. 2), a
5Shannon Entropy has a number of mathematical properties that make it easy to use for predicting behavior in a wide range of
environments.
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Table 2: Example 2
State: ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4
Probability of State: 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
Value of selecting option 1: H H L L
Value of selecting option 2: H L H L
question that this paper attempts to answer.
2.2 Example 2: Perceptual Distance and Biases in Fitting
If different perceptual distances are present in the same choice environment a RU model may be susceptible
to a form of informational bias that has not previously been identified, as demonstrated by the following example.
This is significant for those who wish to conduct welfare or counterfactual analysis because there are many
economically significant examples where, for instance, one option is easier to learn about, as in Example 2.
Consider a choice environment where an agent has two options: option 1 and option 2, which can each
be of high value H , or low value L < H , as is described in Table 2. Assume, contrary to what is possible with
Shannon Entropy, that learning the value of option 1 is less costly than learning the value of option 2.6 For
example, perhaps the agent is interested in investing in one of two businesses that are a priori identical except
for the fact that one is local and easier to learn about, while the other is foreign and harder to learn about. It is
not difficult to come up with other similar examples.
Because payoffs are symmetric, any knowledge about the value of option 1 has the same value to the agent
as the same knowledge about option 2. Further, the cost of said information about option 1 is lower. As such,
while the marginal benefit of information about option 1 or option 2 is the same, the marginal cost of information
about option 1 is lower. We should thus expect research of a rational agent to be more attentive to option 1. If
the agent was deciding between investing in two businesses that are a priori identical, except one is local and
easier to learn about, while the other is foreign and harder to learn about, then we should expect the agent to be
more attentive to the local business.
If both option 1 and option 2 have realized their high value H , we should expect that the agent is more
likely to select option 1. Our intuition is that the agent should be more attentive to option 1, and thus should
be more cognisant of option 1’s high value, and more likely to select it. Similarly, if option 1 and option 2 have
both realized their low value L, then we should expect that the agent is more likely to select option 2.7
Because of this, if an econometrician, who does not know that the two options have the same value
distribution, tried to deduce the two values of option 1, H1 and L1, and the two values of option 2, H2 and L2,
using a multinomial logit regression, they would decide that H1 is more than the true value H , and that L1 is
less than the true value L (as is shown rigorously in Section 5). Fitting thus falls prey to an informational bias,
undermining the value of any counterfactual or welfare analysis.
6With Shannon Entropy it is not possible for the cost of learning the value of option 1 to differ from the cost of learning the value
of option 2. Each option realizes each of its two values with equal probabilities, and with Shannon Entropy it is not possible to have
different perceptual distances in the same choice environment.
7Our intuition is that the agent should be more attentive to option 1, and thus should be more cognisant of option 1’s low value,
and less likely to select it.
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This type of bias has not previously been identified in the literature on RI. Let Pr(n|ω) denote the probabil-
ity that the agent selects option n in state ω. Let Pr(n) =
∑
ω Pr(n|ω)µ(ω) denote the unconditional probability
that option n is selected. Mateˇjka and McKay (2015) show that fitting of multinomial logit results in the value
of an option n in all states ω to be biased by log(Pr(n) · N), where N is the number of available options. The
bias found by Mateˇjka and McKay (2015) can be identified by examining the unconditional choice probabilities
of the agent because the driving mechanism is that the cost of learning causes the agent to be biased towards
options that they have a higher chance of selecting a priori. The bias previously found by Mateˇjka and McKay
(2015) is fundamentally different than the bias demonstrated in this example because their bias does not allow
for an option to be over valued in some states and under valued in others, which is in contrast with our setting
where option 1 is over valued when it is of high value, and is undervalued when it is of low value.
An econometrician who observes equal unconditional choice probabilities in this environment, as is predicted
in this setting by the model developed in this paper, might be tempted conclude, based on the previous literature,
that their analysis is not susceptible to informational biases since each option has the same chance of being
selected a priori, so the bias of option n is log(Pr(n) · N) = log(12 · 2) = 0 ∀n, and thus any counterfactual or
welfare analysis that they conduct is valid. This conclusion may not be correct given the results in this paper.
Further, RU models and RI models with Shannon Entropy can both be rejected for RI with MSSE in this
environment if we are able to alter the correlation between the values of the two options. If a RU model describes
the agent, then changing the correlation between the values of the two options would not change the choice
behavior of the agent. If the behavior of the agent is instead described by MSSE, then changing the correlation
between the values of the two options would change the choice behavior of the agent in individual states. This
effect is because the total information that can be acquired from learning the value of option 1 (the option that is
easier to learn about) changes with the correlation of the options’ values. Further, if the above MSSE specification
is correct, the unconditional choice probabilities of the agent would remain constant when correlation is changed
due to the symmetry of the environment, as long as the agent is doing some learning.8 Finally, if the behavior of
the agent is instead described by Shannon Entropy, then the choice behavior in the individual states could only
change if the unconditional choice probabilities changed, which is not the case with MSSE. With MSSE, since
choice probabilities in a state can be impacted by choice probabilities that are conditioned on some larger subset
of states, not only payoffs and unconditional choice probabilities, choice probabilities in a state can change even
when payoffs and unconditional choice probabilities do not.
3 Multisource Shannon Entropy (MSSE)
In this section we use axioms to develop this paper’s measure of uncertainty. The goal of our axioms are
to measure the total amount of uncertainty, which is the expected cost to the agent of perfectly observing the
state of the world. The measure of total uncertainty that we develop can then be used to study a rationally
inattentive agent because the cost of a noisy information strategy can be taken to be the expected reduction in
8The agent is doing some learning if their choice probabilities differ at all in states of the world that are realized with positive
probability.
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total uncertainty, as is frequently done with Shannon Entropy. Thus, while this paper is interested in studying
an inattentive agent that only partially learns about the state of the world, this section discusses an attentive
agent that perfectly observes the state of the world.
3.1 Formal Setting
As was mentioned in Section 2, we are interested in an agent who is researching the measurable space
(Ω, F). Ω is the finite set of possible states of the world. F is the set of events.
One natural way to think about an agent learning is through a series of questions that have answers that
are uniquely determined by the state of the world. These are questions that you can answer if you know the
state of the world. How do we model such questions? A partition P of Ω is a set of multiple disjoint events
in F whose union is Ω. A question with multiple potential answers is thus equivalent to a partition whenever
the answer to the question is deterministically determined by the state of the world. This equivalence occurs
since there are finite possible states of the world, so every such question must have a finite number of answers,
and we can simply group states of the world based on the answer to the question they produce. Because we are
concerned with questions that have answers that are deterministically determined by the state of the world, the
words ‘question’ and ‘partition’ can be used interchangeably.
The simplest kind of question in this setting is a yes or no question. A yes or no question is equivalent to
a binary partition Pb of Ω, which we define as a set of two events, Pb = {A1, A2}, such that A1 ∪A2 = Ω, and
A1 ∩ A2 = ∅. The two phrases ‘binary partition’ and ‘yes or no question’ can thus be used interchangeably.
If ω ∈ Ω is the state of the world, let the realized event of the partition P = {A1, . . . , Am} be denoted
by P(ω), that is P(ω) = Ai ∈ {A1, . . . , Am} iff ω ∈ Ai. Given a probability measure µ : F → R+, and some
partition P , let C(P , µ) denote the cost of learning the realized event P(ω) of P . C(P , µ), the cost of answering
‘What is the realized event of P?’, given the agent’s prior belief, is the basic building block of this paper.
A learning strategy, S = (P1, . . . , Pn), is a list of partitions whose realized events are successively
observed by the agent such that if Pi, Pj ∈ S, and i 6= j, then Pi 6= Pj . A ‘learning strategy’ is thus ‘a series
of questions’, and the two phrases can be used interchangeably. If a learning strategy consists of only binary
partitions, we call it a binary learning strategy, and denote it Sb = (Pb1 , . . . , P
b
n). The order of the questions
in a learning strategy is important, and changing the order results in a different learning strategy. If, for instance,
some questions are more costly for the agent to answer, and help to identify states that are seldom observed, then
it may seem efficient for a learning strategy to leave these questions towards the end, and inefficient for a learnng
strategy to begin with them. The order of the events in a partition, in contrast, is not important, and switching
the order in which the events in a partition are listed does not result in a different partition.
If P = {A1, . . . , Am} is a partition, let σ(P) denote the σ-algebra generated by P , which is the smallest
σ-algebra that contains all the events A1, . . . , Am in P (which is also the power set of the events in P , since P
is a partition). In general, if B is any collection of partitions, let σ(B) denote the σ-algebra generated by B,
which is the smallest σ-algebra containing all the events in each of the partitions in B. Since a learning strategy
S = (P1, . . . , Pn) is a collection of partitions, we thus use σ(S) to denote the σ-algebra generated by S.
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Sometimes a single question can be as informative as several questions. We say a learning strategy S is
equivalent to a partition P if σ(S) = σ(P), and we say that a series of questions is equivalent to a particular
question if the learning strategy that represents the series of questions is equivalent to the partition that represents
the particular question. What σ(S) = σ(P) means intuitively is that, for any prior probability measure µ : F →
R+, observing the answers to the series of questions in S always leads to the same posterior as observing the
answer to the question ‘what is the realized event of the partition P?’. We can thus read σ(S) = σ(P) as saying
that, for all priors, S and P provide the same amount of information to the agent.
3.2 Axioms
What form should a cost function for information take? This difficult question does not have an obvious
answer, so this paper takes an axiomatic approach. The axioms make explicit the structure that is imposed on
our cost function. Each axiom can be separately evaluated in different contexts, either empirically or through
introspection, to determine how appropriate it is.
Again, while the learning of an agent is frequently inattentive, and this paper wishes to study environments
where the agent only partially learns about the state of the world, this section discusses an attentive agent that
perfectly observes the state of the world. We focus our axioms on attentive learning as we find this to be a more
intuitive exercise than imposing axioms directly on inattentive behavior. When an agent learns in an inattentive
fashion, and only acquires some of the available information, they reduce the amount that remains to be learned,
and thus reduce the subsequent cost of learning the state of the world. The cost of the inattentive learning done
by the agent can then be measured as the reduction in the cost of attentively learning, as subsequent sections
discuss, as long as we can establish a cost of attentively learning the state of the world.9 Our axioms are thus
concerned with the cost of questions, and series of questions, whose answers are deterministically determined by
the state of the world.
We now state the five axioms required to achieve this paper’s measure of uncertainty, the cost of learning
the state of the world:
Axiom 1: C(S, µ), the expected cost of a learning strategy S = (P1, . . . , Pn), given a probability measure µ, is:
C(S, µ) = C(P1, µ) +E
[
C
(
P2, µ(·|P1(ω))
)
+ · · ·+ C
(
Pn, µ(·|∩
n−1
i=1 Pi(ω))
)]
.
Axiom 1 asserts that the cost of a learning strategy S is simply the sum of the costs of learning the
realizations of each of the partitions in S, given the agent’s belief before observing each realization. Axiom 1 is
a form of constant marginal cost because over the course of learning the agent does not fatigue, nor do they gain
experience with research and become better at learning.
9When we discuss an agent that attentively learns the state of the world, we refer to an agent that perfectly observes the state of
the world.
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Axiom 2: Given a partition P , for all probability measures µ:
C(P , µ) ≥ min
Sb
C(Sb, µ),
such that: Sb is equivalent to P .
Axiom 2 asserts that the agent can always learn about their environment in an efficient fashion using simple
yes or no questions. This claim is supported by research in the psychology and psychophysics literatures. Eye
tracking analysis shows that when agents are faced with multiple options they successively compare pairs of the
options along a single attribute dimension (Noguchi & Stewart, 2014, 2018). This suggests that, in practice, agents
are breaking their learning into a number of smaller queries. Further, in the psychology literature these pairwise
comparisons are frequently modelled as ordinal in nature (Noguchi & Stewart, 2018), equivalent to questions with
binary outcomes, e.g. ‘Is option a better than option b in dimension x?’, instead of more complicated questions,
e.g. ‘How much better is option a than option b in dimension x?’. This assumption is made because findings in
the field of psychophysics suggest that agents are good at discriminating stimuli, but are not good at determining
the magnitude of the same stimuli (Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006). This research thus supports this paper’s
decision to model agents as learning through a series of yes or no questions.
Before we introduce the rest of our axioms, we pause to discuss learning strategy invariance, a concept that
helps us to make it explicit what we are assuming with the rest of our axioms. In general, a particular question
P , and an equivalent series of questions S, may produce different expected costs depending on what questions
are selected, and how they are ordered, in S. A given question P , however, may have the peculiar property that,
given any prior, all series of questions that are equivalent to it have the same expected cost. If a question has this
strong property, we say it is learning strategy invariant. Formally, we say a partition P is learning strategy
invariant, if for each probability measure µ, the expected cost C(S, µ) is the same for every learning strategy S
that is equivalent to P .
In many environments there are questions that are not learning strategy invariant. Consider the environ-
ment described in Example 2 in Section 2.2. In this context, let A1 = {ω1, ω2}, A2 = {ω1, ω3}, Pb1 = {A1, A
c
1},
and Pb2 = {A2, A
c
2}. Notice that observing the realized event of P
b
1 is equivalent to learning the value of
option 1, and observing the realized event of Pb2 is equivalent to learning the value of option 2. Now, let
P3 = {{ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}, {ω4}} denote our partition of the outcome space. Notice that the learning strategy
Sb = (Pb1 , P
b
2) is equivalent to P3, because if we answer ‘What is the value of option 1?’, and then answer ‘What
is the value of option 2?’, we have observed the state of the world.
Based on our discussion in Section 2.2, however, we should expect that P3 may not be learning strategy
invariant. Consider S˜b = (Pb2 , P
b
1), which is also equivalent to P3. If the value of option 1 and option 2 were
perfectly correlated, then observing the value of one of them would tell you the value of the other. The cost of
Sb is then be the cost of observing the value of option 1, which we assumed to be less than the cost of observing
the value of option 2, which is be the cost of S˜b. A set of partitions that are certainly learning strategy invariant,
in contrast, is the set of binary partitions:
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Lemma 1. If Pb is a binary partition, then Pb is learning strategy invariant.
Proofs for Section 3 can be found in Appendix 1.
Our three remaining axioms are concerned with the costs of questions that are learning strategy invariant.
These axioms are rather weak in nature, only imposing structure onto the costs of a particular kind of question.
Axiom 3: Suppose P is a learning strategy invariant partition. Suppose µ is a probability measure such that
n events {Ai}
n
i=1 ⊂ P are given probability 1/n. Suppose µ˜ is a different probability measure such that n + 1
events {Bj}
n+1
j=1 ⊆ P are given probability 1/(n + 1). The expected cost of observing the realized event of P is
lower when the probability measure is µ than when the probability measure is µ˜: C(P , µ) < C(P , µ˜).
Axiom 3 makes intuitive sense because there are more events that are realized with positive probability
under µ˜ than there are under µ, and each of these events is less likely to occur. Axiom 3 essentially states that
differentiating between more events that are less likely should be more expensive than differentiating between
fewer events that are more likely. Since P is learning strategy invariant, for each prior, all series of questions that
are equivalent to P have the same expected cost. We can thus envision the agent as always learning about the
realized event of P through the same series of yes or no questions which begin with: ‘Question 1: is the realized
event A1?’, ‘Question 2: is the realized event A2?’, ..., ‘Question n− 1: is the realized event An−1?’, for the first
n − 1 events given positive probability under µ. At each question there is a lower chance under µ˜ compared to
µ that the current question reveals the realized event of P , and the agent can stop asking questions. Under µ˜,
there is also a chance that the first n − 1 questions are not sufficient for learning the realized event of P , and
additional questions are needed to observe the realized event, which is not the case under µ. The expected cost
of learning the realized event of P under µ should thus be lower than the expected cost under µ˜.
We make this assertion only when P is learning strategy invariant. To see why, suppose that the only
event with a positive probability of occurring under µ˜ that is not given a positive probability of occurring under
µ is An+1. If the expected cost of answering ‘is the event An+1?’ is trivially small ǫ under µ˜, so that it is always
beneficial to ask this question first, then the expected cost of learning the realized event may be lower under µ˜
compared to under µ. If the agent starts with ‘Question 0: is the event An+1?’, and then continues with the
questions 1 through n − 1 as described above, then under µ˜ the expected cost of learning the realized event in
P is C(P , µ˜) = ǫ + n
n+1C(P , µ), since there is a
1
n+1 chance that question 0 reveals the realized event, and a
n
n+1 chance question 0 does not reveal the realized event, leaving the agent with a posterior equal to µ, and
facing the original series of questions that are asked under µ. C(P , µ˜) is less than C(P , µ) for small ǫ as long as
C(P , µ) > 0.
Axiom 4: Suppose there are two probability measures µ and µ˜ that assign positive probability to the same
events in the learning strategy invariant partition P . If we let µα be defined for α ∈ [0, 1] so that µα(ω) =
αµ(ω) + (1− α)µ˜(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, C(P , µα) changes continuously in α.
Axiom 4 asserts that if the events that are given a positive probability of occurring in a learning strategy
invariant partition P do not change, then the cost of learning which event in P has occurred, C(P , µ), should
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change continuously with respect to µ. This property for C is intuitive since small changes in the chances of
events occurring should not result in a large change in the cost of a question that differentiates between said
events if which events are possible does not change.
Axiom 5: There is a function c such that for any learning strategy invariant partition P = {A1, . . . , Am}, there
is a constant, λ(P) > 0, such that: C(P , µ) = λ(P)c(µ(A1), . . . , µ(Am)) for all probability measures µ : F → R+.
Axiom 5 asserts that if P is learning strategy invariant, then two things should be true about C(P , µ).
First, C(P , µ) should be measurable with respect to σ(P). We are thus asserting that the expected cost of asking
the question represented by P should be fully determined by the chance that each of its answers occurs. Second,
if P˜ is another learning strategy invariant partition, then the functions C(P , µ) and C(P˜ , µ) should differ only
by a multiplicative constant. We want to allow for learning strategy invariant questions to differ from each other
with regard to how difficult they are to answer, but we do not wish for them to differ in a more fundamental way.
3.3 Minimal Cost of Learning
Learning the realized event of a partition can be done through different learning strategies, but what we
seek is the minimal expected cost of doing so. Given some partition P of Ω, and probability measure µ, define:
C∗(P , µ) = min
S
C(S, µ),
such that: S is equivalent to P .
C∗(P , µ) tells us the minimal expected cost of a learning strategy that is equivalent to P , the minimal expected
cost of a learning strategy that always results in the same posterior as asking ‘What is the realized event of the
partition P?’, given a prior µ. Since Ω is a partition of itself, as a slight abuse of notation, we write C∗(Ω, µ) to
denote the minimal expected cost of observing the state of the world given the agent’s prior µ.
Lemma 2. If partition P is learning strategy invariant, and C satisfies our five axioms, then there exists a
multiplier λ(P) ∈ R++ such that for all probability measures µ:
C∗(P , µ) = λ(P)H(P , µ),
where H is defined as in equation (1).
While Shannon (1948) imposes learning strategy invariance onto all partitions of the possible states of the
world, we instead allow for some partitions to be learning strategy invariant, and for some to not be. When
learning is focused on a particular learning strategy invariant partition, learning costs are analogous to Shannon’s
(1948) original work, as is demonstrated by Lemma 2.
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 together tell us that for each binary partition Pb, there is an associated mul-
tiplier, λ(Pb) ∈ R++, such that for all probability measures µ: C∗(Pb, µ) = λ(Pb)H(Pb, µ). Since there are a
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finite number of binary partitions of Ω, we can order the binary partitions by their associated multipliers. Let λ1
denote the multiplier associated with all binary partitions, denoted {Pb,λ1i }
n1
i=1, with the lowest multiplier.
If the agent can always learn the state of the world by asking questions with multiplier λ1, then σ({P
b,λ1
i }
n1
i=1) =
F , and we letM=1.10 If not, let λ2 denote the multiplier associated with all binary partitions, denoted {P
b,λ2
i }
n2
i=1,
with the second lowest multiplier.
If the agent can always learn the state of the world by asking questions with multipliers λ1 or λ2, then
σ({Pb,λ1i }
n1
i=1, {P
b,λ2
i }
n2
i=1) = F , and we let M = 2. If not, let λ3 denote the multiplier associated with all binary
partitions, denoted {Pb,λ3i }
n3
i=1, with the third lowest multiplier.
Continue in this fashion until we let λM denote the multiplier associated with all binary partitions, denoted
{Pb,λMi }
nM
i=1, with the lowest multiplier such that the state of the world is always revealed when all questions with
equal or lower associated multipliers are asked, that is, the lowestM such that: σ({Pb,λ1i }
n1
i=1, . . . , {P
b,λM
i }
nM
i=1) =
F .
To help make our notation more compact, we can use a group of partitions to generate a finer partition: if
(P1, . . . , Pm) is a group of partitions, let ×{Pi}ni=1 denote the partition such that σ(×{Pi}
n
i=1) = σ(P1, . . . , Pn).
Then, for j ∈ {1, . . . , M},11 let Pλj = ×{P
b,λj
i }
nj
i=1.
MSSE incorporates different perceptual distances because it allows for different events to be different
distances from each other. Events in Pλ1 , for instance, have greater perceptual distances between them than
events in PλM (assuming M > 1).
To establish our measure of uncertainty we want to describe the cost according to C∗ of observing which
state of the world has been realized. Again, since Ω is a partition of itself, we can, as a minor abuse of notation,
write this cost as C∗(Ω, µ): the minimal cost given µ of a learning strategy S such that σ(S) = σ(Ω) = F .
Theorem 1. If C satisfies all five axioms, then there exist partitions Pλ1 , . . . , PλM as defined above, and
constants λ1 < . . . < λM , such that for any probability measure µ on F :
C∗(Ω, µ) = λ1H
(
Pλ1 , µ
)
+E
[
λ2H
(
Pλ2 , µ(·|Pλ1(ω))
)
+ · · ·+ λMH
(
PλM , µ(·|∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω))
)]
,
where H is defined as in equation (1).
In plain language, Theorem 1 says that if the cost of learning satisfies all five axioms, then the cheapest
way (in expectation) to learn the state of the world always involves first asking all the yes or no questions with
the lowest associated multiplier (in any order), then asking all the yes or no questions with the second lowest
multiplier, and continuing in this fashion until the state of the world has been realized.
Theorem 1 generates the more flexible measure of uncertainty that we desired for studying inattentive
behavior. If the agent starts with a prior µ, and does optimal learning that reaches a posterior µ˜, then we let the
cost of this inattentive research be the reduction in the cost of learning the state of the world: C∗(Ω, µ)−C∗(Ω, µ˜),
as is discussed in the next section.
10If M=1, then MSSE collapses to standard Shannon Entropy.
11
M is defined in the proceeding paragraphs.
14
In terms of Shannon’s original context, this paper’s model can be thought of as describing learning of
information from M sources, where source i, for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M}, is capable of providing information about
Pλi(ω). Shannon’s original axioms, in contrast, impose that all partitions P are learning strategy invariant, which
is analogous to all binary partitions having the lowest multiplier, and there only being one information source
relevant for learning.
The axiomatic derivation of the cost benchmark in this paper requires a discrete outcome space for the
state of the world, as is the case with Shannon Entropy. If a continuous outcome space is desired for the state
of the world, however, a measure of uncertainty for a continuous outcome space can be defined in an analogous
manner to the measure of uncertainty defined in Theorem 1 for a discrete outcome space, which is similar to what
is done by Shannon (1948) to apply Shannon Entropy in a continuous setting.
4 Inattentive Learning with MSSE
The following section introduces and solves a model of RI that uses MSSE to measure the cost of acquiring
information. We establish that our new more flexible measure of uncertainty can still be incorporated tractably
into a model of RI, which is not an obvious result. Apart from the use of MSSE instead of Shannon Entropy for
the measurement of uncertainty, this section follows the work of Mateˇjka and McKay (2015) closely so as to aid
comparison between the two models.
Given our result in Theorem 1, we take the expected cost of a particular information strategy to be defined
as:
C(F (s, ω), µ) = E[C∗(Ω, µ)− C∗(Ω, µ(·|s))].
A noisy information strategy reduces the total amount of uncertainty, and we thus measure the cost of the
information strategy as the expected reduction in total uncertainty.
The cost function defined above lies in the class of uniformly posterior-separable cost functions described
by Caplin et al. (2017). The behavior generated in static settings by posterior-separable cost functions has been
shown to be equivalent to the behavior generated by sequential information sampling in some dynamic contexts
(He´bert & Woodford, 2017; Morris & Strack, 2019). In particular, He´bert and Woodford (2017) show that a
class of static cost functions, which they call ‘neighborhood-based’ cost functions, can be micro-founded in this
way. The cost functions explored in this paper that measure the reduction in MSSE are a strict subset of the
‘neighborhood-based’ cost functions described in their paper, and thus the cost functions in this paper are micro-
founded in two ways, directly through the axioms in this paper, and indirectly through the dynamic analysis
conducted by He´bert and Woodford (2017).
4.1 Rationally Inattentive Agent’s Problem
As was discussed in Section 2, the agent’s problem is to maximize the expected value of the option they
select less the cost of learning by choosing an optimal information strategy, and subsequently selecting an option
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based on the signal produced by their information strategy. The agent’s problem can thus be written:
max
F∈∆(RN×Ω)
∑
ω∈Ω
∫
s
V (s)F (ds|ω)µ(ω)−C(F (s, ω), µ), (2)
such that ∀ω ∈ Ω :
∫
s
F (ds, ω) = µ(ω). (3)
The above problem is complicated and not particularly tractable, so we follow Mateˇjka and McKay (2015)
and re-write this problem directly in terms of the choice probabilities of the agent. This process requires the
development of some new notation. Define Sn = {s ∈ RN : a(s) = n}, to be the set of signals that result in the
agent selecting option n. Next, as was done in Section 2, define the chance of option n being selected conditional
on the state of the world to be:
Pr(n|ω) =
∫
s∈Sn
F (ds|ω), (4)
and for event A ∈ F , define the chance of n being selected conditional on A being realized to be:
Pr(n|A) =
∑
ω∈A
Pr(n|ω)µ(ω|A). (5)
Define the unconditional choice probability of option n to be:
Pr(n) =
∑
ω∈Ω
Pr(n|ω)µ(ω). (6)
Denote the collection {Pr(n|ω)}Nn=1 by P. Using this notation, we can re-write the agent’s problem:
Lemma 3. Choice probabilities P are the outcome of a solution to the agent’s problem in (2) subject to (3) iff
they solve:
max
P
∑
n∈N
∑
ω∈Ω
vn(ω)Pr(n|ω)µ(ω)−C(P, µ), (7)
such that: ∀n ∈ N , Pr(n|ω) ≥ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, (8)
and
∑
n∈N
Pr(n|ω) = 1 ∀ω ∈ Ω. (9)
Proofs for Section 4, Section 5, and Section 6, can be found in Appendix 2
This new problem, where the agent selects their conditional choice behavior P, is substantially easier to solve
than the problem where the agent picks their information strategy F (s, ω).
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4.2 Behavior of a Rationally Inattentive Agent
Using Lemma 3, we can establish a necessary condition for the optimal behavior of the agent with Theorem 2,
and then use said necessary condition to simplify the maximization problem undertaken by the agent with
Corollary 1.
Theorem 2:
If P is the solution to (7) subject to (8) and (9), then ∀n ∈ N , and ∀ω ∈ Ω, the probability that option n
is selected in state w satisfies:
Pr(n|ω) =
Pr(n)
λ1
λM Pr(n|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . Pr(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM∑
ν∈N
Pr(ν)
λ1
λM Pr(ν|Pλ1 (ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . Pr(ν| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λM−λN−1
λM e
vν (ω)
λM
. (10)
Those familiar with the work of Mateˇjka and McKay (2015) will recognize the above formula as the MSSE
analogue of Mateˇjka and McKay (2015)’s Theorem 1. When all partitions are learning strategy invariant, λ1 =
λ2 = · · · = λM , and the above formula collapses to Mateˇjka and McKay (2015)’s Theorem 1.
With standard Shannon Entropy, the chance that the agent selects an option thus depends only on the
unconditional chances of the options being selected, and the realized values of the options. With MSSE, in
contrast, as the above formula indicates, the chance that the agent selects an option n in a particular state
of the world ω depends on the unconditional chances of the options being selected, Pr(n), the realized values
of the options vn(ω), as well as the probabilities of the options being selected in similar states of the world.
Here ‘similar states of the world’ refers to states that induce the same realization of partitions with associated
multipliers smaller than λM . It makes sense that when easier to observe pieces of information indicate that an
option n is likely of above average value, that the agent should select option n with a higher probability, even if
the above average value has not been realized. For a more complete discussion of the intuitive properties of the
choice behavior described in Theorem 2, please see Appendix 5.
Corollary 1:
Conditional and unconditional choice probabilities described in (5) and (6) are a solution to (7) subject to
(8) and (9) iff they comply with Theorem 2 and solve:
max
P
∑
ω∈Ω
log
( ∑
n∈N
Pr(n)
λ1
λM Pr(n|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . Pr(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM
)
µ(ω),
such that:
∀A ∈ F : Pr(n|A) ≥ 0 ∀n, and
∑
n∈N
Pr(n|A) = 1.
Corollary 1 is helpful because it reduces the number of choice variables faced by the agent, which means it
is easier for the researcher to find optimal agent behavior. When solving the problem described in Lemma 3, the
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agent must choose Pr(n|ω) for all n and ω. When solving the problem in Corollary 1, the agent must only choose
Pr(n|A) for all n and A ∈ ×{Pλi}
M−1
i=1 , which is a coarser partition. In Example 2, for instance, if the agent tries
to solve Lemma 3 they must pick their probabilities of selecting option 1 and option 2 in four different states of
the world, while if they solve the problem in Corollary 1 they must only pick their probabilities of selecting option
1 and option 2 in two events, and then Theorem 2 dictates their choice probabilities in each state of the world.
This reduction makes finding optimal behavior of the agent easier for the researcher because there are thus half
as many choice variables when analysing Example 2 if Corollary 1 is used instead of Lemma 3.
Any choice behavior that complies with Corollary 1 and Theorem 2 is optimal. Optimal choice behavior
may not be unique, however. If two options are known a priori to take the same value in each state of the
world, for instance, then the agent can shift probability from one of these two options to the other whenever
the former has a strictly positive probability of being selected in an optimal solution. While these sorts of
environments are possible, generically optimal behavior is unique. This feature of optimal behavior should be
evident since payoffs are linear, and costs are strictly convex. The exact sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of
a solution are withheld, but for the solution not to be unique, similar to the case with Shannon Entropy studied
by Mateˇjka and McKay (2015), a very rigid form of co-movement is required between payoffs and states.
5 Comparisons with the Standard Model
In this section we compare and contrast the choice behavior that is produced by RI with Shannon Entropy
and the choice behavior produced by the RI model developed in Section 4 that uses the MSSE measure developed
in Section 3. We first discuss the RU model that is analogous to RI with MSSE. We then revisit the two motivating
examples, Example 1 from Section 2.1 and Example 2 from Section 2.2.
5.1 Analogous Random Utility Model
It is standard practice to use a RU model to describe discrete choice settings. In such a model, the agent
picks the option with the largest sum un = vn + ǫn over all options n ∈ N . Generally, un represents the value
of the option to the agent, vn represents the average value of the option across agents, and ǫn represents an
idiosyncratic value to the agent. The role ǫn plays is up to interpretation, however, and is determined by the
researchers specification (Train, 2009). In a setting where agents are thought to be rationally inattentive, the
above terms are interpreted in a different way because the agent’s noisy behavior is generated by perceptual error
instead of idiosyncratic differences in taste. In such settings, un represents the perceived value to the agent, vn
represents the true value to the agent, and ǫn is interpreted as an unobservable perceptual error that results
from the noisy information strategy selected by the agent. Woodford (2014) argues that this latter interpretation
is necessary in many contexts due to the stochastic responses observed in perceptual discrimination tasks such
as those administered by Dean and Neligh (2018), which are akin to our Example 1 in Section 2.1. While the
interpretation of ǫn is relevant for welfare analysis, it is inconsequential for the description of choice behavior.
How then can MSSE be interpreted in terms of an RU framework, and what insights may be provided about the
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fitting of RU models?
Mateˇjka and McKay (2015) point out that choice probabilities predicted by RI with Shannon Entropy
correspond to multinomial logit choice probabilities where it is as if option values have been shifted due to the
agent’s prior about potential values. An option that seems more desirable a priori is more likely to be selected
by the agent in every state of the world, and thus is overvalued by a multinomial logit regression.
Rational inattention with MSSE takes this one step further, allowing the shift in perceived value to also
depend on easier to observe information sources (binary partitions associated multipliers that are less than λM ).
This flexibility seems natural in many real world environments. Consider an agent that is trying to select a
restaurant to go to. One may expect that the chance of the agent selecting a given option to increase not only
with the quality of the restaurant, and their prior impression of it, but also with easy to observe information such
as on-line ratings the restaurant may have received.
Theorem 3:
The choice behavior described by P, a solution to (7) subject to (8) and (9), is identical to the behavior
produced by an RU model where each option n ∈ N has perceived value:
un = v˜n + αn + ǫn,
where v˜n =
vn(ω)
λM
, ǫn has an iid Gumbel distribution, and:
αn =
λ1
λM
log(NPr(n)) + λ2−λ1
λM
log(NPr(n|Pλ1(ω))) + · · ·+
λM−λM−1
λM
log(NPr(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))).
5.2 Example 1 Revisited
We now revisit Example 1 from Section 2.1, which is described in Table 1. It seems natural that it should
be easier for the agent to answer the question ‘Are 60 of the balls blue?’, than it is for them to answer ‘Are
51 or more of the balls blue?’. Similarly, it seems natural that it should be easier for the agent to answer the
question ‘Are 60 of the balls red?’, than it is for them to answer ‘Are 51 or more of the balls red?’. Symmetry
also means that the questions ‘Are 60 of the balls blue?’ and ‘Are 60 of the balls red?’ should have the same
expected cost, and the questions ‘Are 51 or more of the balls blue?’ and ‘Are 51 or more of the balls red?’
should have the same expected cost. We can thus assume Pλ1 = {A1, A2, A3} = {{ω1}, {ω2 ∪ ω3}, {ω4}}, and
Pλ2 = {{ω1 ∪ ω2}, {ω3 ∪ ω4}}.
Solutions to Corollary 1 in this environment for a range of λ1 can be found in Figure 1 and Figure 3. In
both figures, when λ1 is small relative to λ2 the agent chooses option 1 in state ω1 with a high probability, and
choose option 2 in state ω4 with a high probability. As λ1 increases towards λ2, the agent becomes more likely
to choose option 2 in state ω1, and becomes more likely to choose option 1 in state ω4. The difference between
Figure 1 and Figure 3 is that the behavior in Figure 3 depicts an environment where y is larger. The resultant
difference in behavior between Figure 1 and Figure 3 makes sense given that the agent has incentive to choose a
more informative information strategy in Figure 3. For each λ1, there is a higher chance that the agent selects
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Figure 3:
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option 1 in ω1 and option 2 in ω4 in the environment depicted in Figure 3 compared to the environment depicted
in Figure 1.
Solutions to Corollary 1 combined with Theorem 2 mean that the chance of the agent selecting option 1 is
increasing in the number of blue balls. This can be seen in Figure 2 and Figure 4, which depict optimal behavior
in each state of the world for a range of λ1. An agent that behaves in an optimal manner according to RI with
MSSE is thus better able to discern the state of the world when there are 40 of one color ball and 60 of the
other than when there are 49 of one color and 51 of the other. This is supported by the experimental work
of Dean and Neligh (2018), and is in contrast with the behavior predicted by a model of RI that uses Shannon
Entropy.
To see further demonstration of what solutions to Corollary 1 can look like, please see Example 6 in
Appendix 3, which examines a similar environment with an expanded outcome space that features more levels of
perceptual distances.
Morris and Yang (2016), identify a related issue with the lack of perceptual distance in models using
Shannon entropy, and warn against the use of Shannon Entropy in some continuous settings because it predicts
discontinuous changes in behavior at places where payoffs change discontinuously: “Because entropy reduction
has a tractable functional form for the cost of information, it has been widely used in economic settings where it
does not reflect information processing costs and where the insensitivity to the distance between states does not
make sense ... this paper contains a warning about use of entropy as a cost of information in strategic settings”
(Morris & Yang, 2016, p. 5). MSSE maintains the desirable tractability of Shannon Entropy they mention, and
in the limit can be used to produce the kind of continuous behavior that Morris and Yang (2016) desire. Morris
and Yang’s (2016) intuition is that the cost of differentiating between two states should increase to infinity as
the perceptual distance between them goes to zero. When two such states are on either side of a point where
payoffs change discontinuously, Morris and Yang (2016) argue that the infinite cost of differentiating between
states locally should result in an agent having the same behavior on either side of the point where payoffs jump.
With MSSE, an arbitrary number of different perceptual distances can be incorporated, and if λM goes to infinity,
optimal behavior on either side of the point converges in the limit, as is demonstrated by Example 7 in Appendix 3.
5.3 Example 2 Revisited
We now revisit Example 2 from Section 2.2, which is described in Table 2. We assumed that learning the
value of option 1 is less costly than learning the value of option 2. That is to say, answering the question ‘Is
option 1 of value H?’ has a lower expected cost to the agent than the question ‘Is option 2 of value H?’. We can
thus assume: Pλ1 = {A1, A2} = {{ω1 ∪ ω2}, {ω3 ∪ ω4}}, and Pλ2 = {{ω1 ∪ ω3}, {ω2 ∪ ω4}}.
Solutions to Corollary 1 in this environment for a range of λ1 can be found in Figure 5. As can be seen in
Figure 5, when λ1 is small compared to λ2, the agent selects option 1 with a high probability when it is of value
H , and selects option 2 with a high probability when option 1 is of value L. As λ1 increases relative to λ2, the
chance of option 1 being selected when it is of value H decreases. Similarly, as λ1 increases relative to λ2, the
chance of option 1 being selected when it is of value L increases. Note that the solutions to Corollary 1 mean
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Figure 5:
that the agent is more likely to select option 1 when state ω1 has been realized since Pr(1|A1) > Pr(2|A1), and
more likely to select option 2 when state ω4 has been realized since Pr(1|A2) < Pr(2|A2), as can be observed with
Theorem 2.
Solutions to Corollary 1 combined with Theorem 3 mean that if an econometrician tries to fit this environ-
ment with a multinomial logit model that their estimate of H1, the high value of option 1, is biased upwards by
λ2−λ1
λ2
log(2Pr(1|A1)), which is greater than zero since Pr(1|A1) > 1/2, and their estimate of L1, the low value of
option 1, is biased downwards by λ2−λ1
λ2
log(2Pr(1|A2)), which is less than zero since Pr(1|A2) < 1/2. These biases
are despite the fact that the unconditional chance of either option being selected is the same: Pr(1) = Pr(2) = 1/2.
As such, the econometrician may have believed their analysis was not susceptible to informational biases if they
had used Shannon Entropy to model the environment.
6 Consideration and Non-Compensatory Choice Rules
In the marketing literature it has long been established that agents do not consider all the options that are
available to them, and consideration sets have been the focus of an extensive body of research (Hauser & Wernerfelt,
1990). Firms, however, are interested in understanding the characteristics that lead to their product being selected,
and a theory of choice seeks to explain the option selected by an agent. Why then is so much effort committed
to understanding consideration sets, which are not necessarily observable, and are simply an intermediate stage
in the choice process?
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The formation of the consideration set is viewed by the marketing literature as an important process to
understand in and of itself because it is thought that the factors that determine the consideration set may be
different than the factors that determine which option is selected from the consideration set. This distinction can
have important counterfactual implications. A firm that is trying to get their product selected must ensure that
it has both the characteristics required for acceptance into the consideration set, and the characteristics required
for it to be selected from the consideration set. Increasing the value of a product to the agent does not increase
the chance of it being selected if it is not being considered, and if a product is not being considered, then it is
crucial to identify the characteristics that determine consideration.
We define a consideration set in the following fashion: suppose that when the agent faces a set of options, N ,
that an optimal information strategy is chosen and results in conditional choice probabilities P = {Pr(n|ω)}Nn=1,
define the consideration set in the state of the world ω to be C(ω) ≡ {n ∈ N|Pr(n|ω) > 0}, and define the
consideration set to be C ≡ {n ∈ N|Pr(n) > 0}. We say an option n is considered in the state of the world
ω if n ∈ C(ω), and we say an option n is considered if Pr(n) > 0, i.e. ∃ω such that n ∈ C(ω). Our definition of
a consideration set has the advantage that it can be observed in the data, and fits with the definition given by
Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2018).
In the marketing literature the determination of the agent’s consideration set is frequently modelled as
the outcome of a heuristic style ‘non-compensatory’ choice rule, which have been said to fit closely with agents’
self reports of how their consideration sets are formed (Hauser, Toubia, Evgeniou, Befurt, & Dzyabura, 2010;
Payne, 1976), and have basis in the psychology literature (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). While ‘non-compensatory’
choice rules are ubiquitous in the marketing literature on consideration sets, and have been touched upon in the
economics literature, a standard definition of what qualifies a choice rule as ‘non-compensatory’ is hard to come
by. Manzini and Mariotti (2012), for instance, quote the work of Tversky (1969), and in the quote Tversky refers
to lexiographic semiorders as a “noncompensatory principle” (Tversky, 1969, p. 40), but neither work provides
a definition of non-compensatory. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s adage about pornography, “I know it
when I see it” (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 1964), is applicable to ‘non-compensatory’ choice rules in most circumstances,
however, and most people familiar with the phrase would agree that the definition given in the following paragraph
is fitting.
In this paper we define the behavior of the agent to be non-compensatory if there are states of the world
ωi, ωj ∈ Ω, and an option n ∈ N , such that: µ(ωi) = µ(ωj), vm(ωi) = vm(ωj) ∀m ∈ {N\n}, vn(ωi) > vn(ωj),
and under optimal behavior: Pr(n|ωi) < Pr(n|ωj). In plainer language, the behavior of the agent is non-
compensatory if, all else equal, increasing the value of an option to the agent can result in it being less likely to
be selected.
Two common examples of ‘non-compensatory’ choice rules are disjunctive rules and conjunctive rules. The
agent uses a disjunctive rule to form their consideration set if an option is considered when it features at least
one of a predetermined list of characteristics: the agent considers a car when it gets 30 or more miles per gallon or
it has a safety rating of at least four out of five. The agent uses a conjunctive rule to form their consideration
set if an option is considered when it features all of a predetermined list of characteristics: the agent considers a
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car when it gets 30 or more miles per gallon and it has a safety rating of at least four out of five.
It is easy to see that if the agent’s valuation of the car increases continuously with the characteristics
of the car, then the agent forming their consideration set based on the disjunctive choice rule outlined in the
previous paragraph could result in non-compensatory behavior. Suppose option n gets 30 miles per gallon and
has a safety rating of three out of five. Option n is considered with these attributes, but if the miles per gallon
of option n is reduced by any amount, then a full point increase in the safety rating is needed to maintain option
n’s membership in the consideration set. Thus, for small reductions of miles per gallon, and an increase in the
safety rating of half a point, option n is more valuable to the agent, but is no longer included in the consideration
set. A similar logic applies to the conjunctive choice rule outlined in the previous paragraph.
The disparity between the value of an option and its inclusion in the consideration set that is found
in the marketing literature is mirrored in the economics literature, where it is often assumed that the option
selected from the consideration set is that which has the highest value to the agent (Manzini & Mariotti, 2014;
Masatlioglu, Nakajima, & Ozbay, 2012). If the consideration set simply consisted of the options with the highest
values to the agent, a theory of consideration sets would be vacuous. In Manzini and Mariotti (2014), for instance,
they say: “a higher choice frequency for a might not be due to a genuine preference for a over b ... an alternative
may be chosen more frequently than another by virtue of the attention paid to it” (2014, p. 4). Even if it is
not stated explicitly, it thus seems that the economic literature’s interest in consideration sets stems from their
generation of non-compensatory behavior. This makes sense as non-compensatory behavior challenges the logic
of revealed preference analysis, which makes welfare and counterfactual analysis more difficult.
Thus far, the economic literature has predominately focused on the identification of consideration sets,
and their implications for choice behavior, generally assuming they are formed through an exogenous process
(Manzini & Mariotti, 2014; Masatlioglu et al., 2012). This means the economic literature on consideration sets
has done little to explain the non-compensatory behavior associated with the formation of consideration sets, and
why it might be prevalent. A foundation for non-compensatory behavior may thus be of interest to economists.
If consideration sets are a response to a costly learning environment, as is frequently postulated in both
the marketing and economic literatures, then a model of rational inattention may seem like the perfect setting
in which to study non-compensatory choice. Caplin et al. (2018) demonstrate that RI paired with Shannon
Entropy results in the endogenous formation of consideration sets based on the prior beliefs of the agent. RI
with Shannon Entropy thus provides a testable framework that can be used to predict and further study the
formation of consideration sets. This is an important result given the marketing literature’s desire to understand
the formation of consideration sets.
RI paired with Shannon Entropy also results in a dichotomy between value and choice: the most valuable
option may not be selected with the highest probability if the agent thinks a priori that it is unlikely the option
is valuable. RI paired with Shannon Entropy, however, is incapable of explaining the behavior that is explored
in the marketing literature and epitomized by non-compensatory choice rules.
The dichotomy between value and choice created by the agent’s prior in a model with Shannon Entropy
is not what is being modelled when a non-compensatory choice rule is used in the marketing literature, and
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Shannon Entropy does not result in non-compensatory choice behavior. With Shannon Entropy, decreasing the
realization of the value of an option, ceteris paribus, always results in that option being selected with a weakly
lower probability (strictly lower probability if the option is not selected with zero probability, see Example 4). If a
change is made in the characteristics of an option, and it is selected with a lower probability, then the conclusion
reached by a model of RI with Shannon Entropy is that the option’s value has been reduced. This is not consistent
with the conclusions that could be drawn from the disjunctive and conjunctive choice rules outlined above.
MSSE causes consideration sets to be formed in a fashion that is substantially different from how con-
sideration sets are formed with Shannon Entropy, as is demonstrated by Example 3. MSSE also results in
non-compensatory choice behavior, in contrast with Shannon Entropy, as is demonstrated by Example 4. This is
significant because it means MSSE provides a testable framework with which to study non-compensatory behavior.
6.1 Consideration Sets, Non-Compensatory Choice, and Rational Inattention
Suppose again that when the agent faces a set of options, N , that an optimal information strategy is chosen
and results in conditional choice probabilities P = {Pr(n|ω)}Nn=1. Now suppose the agent’s problem is changed so
that there is a new option x available. Is this new option considered? Let the new set of options be denoted by
N˜ = N ∪ x, let the new optimal consideration set be denoted C˜, and let the new optimal consideration set in the
state of the world ω be denoted C˜(ω).
To determine if the new option x is considered, x needs to be compared to a representative value of the
options currently being considered, and given a score in each state of the world. x is considered if it scores well
enough across all states of the world.
To describe when x is considered, we first need to establish what x is compared to in each state of the
world. In state ω, option x is compared to a weighted average of the options currently being considered, but
the weight assigned to an option n that is currently being considered depends on the unconditional probability
of it being selected, as well as each of the conditional probabilities of it being selected Pr(n| ∩ji=1 Pλi(ω)) for
j ∈ {1, . . .M − 1}. If P is a solution to (7) subject to (8) and (9) when the set of options is N , we define the
representative value in state ω of the options being considered before the introduction of x to be:
R(ω) =
∑
n∈C
Pr(n)
λ1
λM (Pr(n|Pλ1(ω)))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . (Pr(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω)))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM , ∀ω ∈ Ω.
In the case of Shannon Entropy (when λ1 = . . . = λM = λ), this representative value is much simpler since the
weight used for each option is just its unconditional probability of being selected.
We next need to assign a score to x in each state of the world. This is easier to do. We define the score
of option x in state ω to be:
sx(ω) =
e
vx(ω)
λM
R(ω)
Using our new notation, we are ready to state the results that describes when x is considered.
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Proposition 1:
In the case of Shannon Entropy:
i: if
∑
ω∈Ω
sx(ω)µ(ω) > 1, then x ∈ C˜.
ii: if
∑
ω∈Ω
sx(ω)µ(ω) < 1, then x /∈ C˜.
Proof. Please see Appendix 2. Implied by Proposition 1 in Caplin et al. (2018).
In a stylized sense, in the case of Shannon Entropy, there is thus a single threshold that the new option
must overcome if it is to be included in the consideration set. x is considered if its score is on average more than
one, and x is not considered if its score is on average less than one.
With MSSE, in contrast, there are multiple thresholds that the new option has the opportunity to overcome.
Define the easier to observe events to be E = ×{Pλi}
M−1
i=1 , which are the events that can be observed using all
but the most expensive non-trivial binary partition. Each event A ∈ E creates a different threshold that the new
option has the potential to overcome. Events in E can also be combined to create larger events that fit better
with verbally expressed heuristics, and create what can be thought of as a new associated threshold. Using the
above notation, we can then state the MSSE analogue of Proposition 1:
Proposition 2:
With MSSE:
i: if ∃A ∈ E , with ω˜ ∈ A, s.t.:
λ1
λM
(∑
ω∈Ω
sx(ω)µ(ω)
)
+
λ2 − λ1
λM
( ∑
ω∈Pλ1(ω˜)
sx(ω)µ(ω|Pλ1(ω˜))
)
+ . . . +
λM − λM−1
λM
(∑
ω∈A
sx(ω)µ(ω|A)
)
> 1,
then x ∈ C˜,
ii: if ∀A ∈ E , and ω˜ ∈ A :
λ1
λM
(∑
ω∈Ω
sx(ω)µ(ω)
)
+
λ2 − λ1
λM
( ∑
ω∈Pλ1(ω˜)
sx(ω)µ(ω|Pλ1(ω˜))
)
+ . . . +
λM − λM−1
λM
(∑
ω∈A
sx(ω)µ(ω|A)
)
< 1,
then x /∈ C˜.
If λ1 converges to λM , which means we are approaching the case of Shannon Entropy, then only the first term
is relevant, and we can seen that the result approaches that of Proposition 1, since the representative values
converge to the representative values in the case of Shannon Entropy.
MSSE results in non-compensatory behavior, but with MSSE, as is true with Shannon Entropy, if an option
is considered in one state of the world, then it is considered in every state of the world. With Shannon Entropy,
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Table 3: Example 3
State: ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4
Probability: 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
Value of selecting option 1: H L H L
Value of selecting option 2: L H L H
Value of selecting option 3: M M L L
this is evident since Theorem 2 implies that optimal behavior results in:
Pr(n|ω) =
Pr(n)e
vn(ω)
λ∑
ν∈N
Pr(ν)e
vν (ω)
λ
∀n ∈ N , ∀ω ∈ Ω.
With Shannon Entropy, it is thus trivially true that if an option is considered there is a positive probability of
it being selected in each state of the world: Pr(n) > 0 =⇒ Pr(n|ω) > 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω. This result is not as evident
with MSSE. While Pr(n) may be larger than zero, if Pr(n|Pλ1(ω)) = 0, for instance, then Theorem 2 implies
Pr(n|ω) = 0. This, however, is never the case with MSSE. With MSSE, as with Shannon Entropy, if an option is
in the consideration set in one state of the world, then it is in the consideration set in every state of the world:
Proposition 3:
If P is a solution to (7) subject to (8) and (9), then:
∀n ∈ N : n ∈ C =⇒ n ∈ C(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Proposition 3 means that with MSSE the agent considers the same options in every state of the world,
and changes in characteristics (changing from one state of the world to another) cannot change which options are
considered, as could be the case if consideration sets were formed according to a disjunctive or conjunctive choice
rule. MSSE, however, can generate behavior that is approximately equal to a choice rule where considerations
sets are determined by a non-compensatory choice rule such as a disjunctive or conjunctive choice rule, as is
demonstrated in Example 4.
6.2 Example 3: Unique Consideration Set Formation
Consider an environment where an agent initially has two options to choose from: option 1 and option
2. For simplicity, let us assume that both option 1 and option 2 realize a high value H with probability 1/2,
realize a low value L < H with probability 1/2, and that the value of option 1 is perfectly negatively correlated
with the value of option 2. Suppose a firm is considering introducing a third option, option 3, into the market.
Assume option 3 realizes the low value L with probability 1/2, realizes a medium value M (L < M < H) with
probability 1/2, and that the value of option 3 is drawn independently from the values of option 1 and option 2.
This environment is described in Table 3. If it is introduced, does the agent consider option 3? That is, does the
agent select option 3 with some positive probability if it is introduced into the market?
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Table 4: Example 4
State: ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4 ω5 ω6
Probability: 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
Value of selecting option 1: M H L M H L
Value of selecting option 2: M L H M L H
Value of selecting option 3: M M M H + ǫ L L
MSSE and Shannon Entropy have substantially different predictions for whether or not option 3 is included
in the agent’s consideration set in this environment. If the agent is assumed to do research according to Shannon
Entropy, then option 3 is not considered, no matter what λ is chosen to represent the cost of research, as is
shown by Proposition 1, and is discussed in the next paragraph. If the agent is instead assumed to do research
according to MSSE, then there are information structures and parameter values such that option 3 is considered,
as is shown later in this subsection.
If we assume that the agent pays to learn according to Shannon Entropy, then Pr(1) = Pr(2) is optimal,
since payoffs are linear and the cost of research is convex. Proposition 1 then tells us option 3 is not considered
since ∀λ > 0:
1
2e
L
λ + 12e
M
λ
1
2e
L
λ + 12e
H
λ
< 1.
If we instead assume that it is easier for the agent to learn the value of option 3 than it is for them
to learn the values of option 1 and option 2, then: Pλ1 = {A1, A2} = {{ω1, ω2}, {ω3, ω4}}, and Pλ2 =
{{ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}, {ω4}}. Since Pr(1|Pλ1(ω)) = Pr(2|Pλ1(ω)) is always optimal for each ω, as payoffs are linear
and the cost of research is convex, if:
e
M
λ2
1
2e
L
λ2 + 12e
H
λ2
> 1,
which would be the case if M is close to H , then Proposition 2 tells us that the agent considers option 3 when
λ1 is close to 0 based on its merits in A1. This makes a lot of sense intuitively. If λ1 is close to 0, then it is
essentially free for the agent to observe the value of option 3. If they observe that option 3 takes value M , and
M is close enough to H (relative to λ2), then we should expect the agent to select option 3.
6.3 Example 4: Non-Compensatory Behavior
Consider the environment described in Table 4, where L < M < H , and ǫ > 0. If the agent pays for
learning in this environment according to Shannon Entropy, then the agent always has a higher probability of
selecting option 3 in ω4 than ω1, unless their probability of selecting option 3 is 0 in both. This is because the
only difference between ω1 and ω4 is that option 3 has a higher value in ω4. With MSSE, in contrast, under
certain information structures and parameter values, there is a probability close to one of option 3 being selected
in ω1, and a probability close to zero of option 3 being selected in ω4. The behavior of the agent can thus be seen
as non-compensatory under MSSE.
Assume, for instance, that it is easier for the agent to learn whether or not the value of option 3 is M , and
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Figure 6:
all other learning is the same level of difficulty:
Pλ1 = {A1, A2} = {{ω1, ω2, ω3}, {ω4, ω5, ω6}}, and Pλ2 = {{ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}, {ω4}, {ω5}, {ω6}}.
Note: Pr(1|Pλ1(ω)) = Pr(2|Pλ1(ω)) is always optimal for all ω, as payoffs are linear and the cost of research is
convex. Figure 6 depicts solutions to Corollary 1 in this environment. As you can see, if λ1 is close to zero, then
option 3 is essentially always picked in A1, and option 3 is essentially never picked in A2. It thus must be that
Pr(3|ω1) > Pr(3|ω4), even though the only difference between ω1 and ω4 is that option 3 has a higher value in
ω4. MSSE can thus generate non-compensatory behavior.
Proposition 3 means that MSSE cannot result in consideration sets being formed in a non-compensatory
fashion by, for instance, a conjunctive or disjunctive choice rule, as the consideration set is formed based on the
prior and is the same in each state of the world. In some cases, however, it is approximately true that MSSE
results in the consideration set being formed according to a non-compensatory choice rule. Consider the setting
of Example 4, and assume that λ1 is close to zero, the three options are cars, and that the realization of Pλ1
determines the safety rating and miles per gallon of the three options. Then, if in A1 option 1 and option 2 have
characteristics that satisfy the conjunctive choice rule outlined above, and option 3 does not, while in A2 option
3 has characteristics that satisfy the conjunctive choice rule outlined above, and option 1 and option 2 do not,
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then it is approximately true that the agent’s consideration set is formed according to the non-compensatory
conjunctive choice rule outline above, as is shown in Figure 6. Further, in such a setting, if there are multiple
options in the approximate consideration set, then it appears that the agent is selecting from their consideration
set based on a RU model that is described by a logit regression where the values are normalized by λ2. This
description of behavior, a combination of a non-compensatory choice rule and a logit regression in a two-stage
process, is very similar to fitting that is carried out in the marketing literature. For example, Gensch (1987)
carries out exactly this kind of fitting, first narrowing down the agent’s options in a first stage with a maximum-
likelihood-hierarch model, then fitting a logit model in the second stage. Gensch (1987) furthr notes that the
maximum-likelihood-hierarch model in the first stage could be replaced by a conjunctive or disjunctive rule.
7 Rejecting MSSE
MSSE is a more general measure of uncertainty compared Shannon Entropy. It is, however, not infallible
as it does impose some testable predictions. MSSE, for instance, cannot allow for the the perceptual distance
between an event and its complement to change with the probability distribution over the outcome space. Axiom 5
requires that the cost of differentiating between an event A and its complement is measurable with respect to
σ(P = {A, Ac}). This means that the cost of differentiating between A and its complement can only depend
on the probability of A occurring and the probability of Ac occurring, it cannot depend on the probability of
different subsets of A or Ac occurring. The limitation imposed by Axiom 5 is demonstrated well by Example 5.
7.1 Example 5: Rejecting Multisource Shannon Entropy
Consider an environment where an agent is faced with a screen that shows 100 balls, each of which is either
red or blue. The agent is offered a prize that they may either accept (option 1) or reject to get a payoff of zero
(option 2). The agent is told that if the majority of the balls on the screen are blue then the prize is y ∈ R++,
and if the majority of the balls on the screen are red then the prize is −y.
As in Example 1, there are four possible states of the world: there are either 60 blue balls and 40 red balls,
51 blue balls and 49 red balls, 49 blue balls and 51 red balls, or 40 blue balls and 60 red balls.
As in Example 1, it should be easier for the agent to differentiate between ω1 and ω4 than it is for
them to differentiate between ω2 and ω3. Based on symmetry we can thus assume Pλ1 = {A1, A2, A3} =
{{ω1}, {ω2 ∪ ω3}, {ω4}}, and Pλ2 = {{ω1 ∪ ω2}, {ω3 ∪ ω4}}.
Unlike Example 1, the probability of ω1 is 1/2, the probability of ω2 is zero, and the probability of ω3
and ω4 depend on the value of a constant α ∈ {0, 1/2}. The agent is assumed to know α. This environment is
described in Table 5.
It is this author’s intuition that the cost of answering the question ‘Are 60 of the balls blue?’ (‘has event
A1 been realized?’) should be increasing in α. As α increases A1 and its complement A
c
1 become more similar,
and thus it should be harder to differentiate between A1 and its complement A
c
1 when α = 1/2 than when α = 0.
MSSE cannot accommodate this kind of change in perceptual distance, however, and imposes that the cost of
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Table 5: Example 5
State: ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4
Balls in State: 60 Blue & 40 Red 51 Blue & 49 Red 49 Blue & 51 Red 40 Blue & 60 Red
Probability: 1/2 0 α 1/2− α
Value of selecting option 1: y y -y -y
Value of selecting option 2: 0 0 0 0
differentiating between A1 and A
c
1 is constant in α. This is because the cost of differentiating between A and its
complement can only be a function of their probabilities, which do not change as α changes.
A RI model with MSSE predicts that the chance of option 1 being selected in ω1 is the same for α = 0
and α = 1/2. This is the case because the only difference between the research problem when α = 0 and when
α = 1/2 is that probability is shifted from A3 to A2. Learning about A2 and A3 is identical for the agent, and
thus the agent’s problem has not really changed. MSSE can thus be rejected if it is not the case that the chance
that the agent selects option 1 in Example 5 is the same when α = 0 and when α = 1/2.
8 Conclusion
Rational inattention models that use Shannon Entropy to measure the cost of learning demonstrate that
informational biases in random utility models can be significant for welfare and counterfactual analysis. The
biases that have previously been identified in the literature are independent of the realized state of the world,
depending only on the agent’s prior about the environment. These previously identified biases manifest themselves
in the unconditional choice probabilities of the agent.
This paper contributes to the literature by proposing and axiomatizing a new measure of uncertainty that
features perceptual distance identifies a new kind of informational bias. The new form of bias can be present
even when the agent has the same unconditional chance of selecting each option, which may seem to indicate an
unbiased environment based on the previous literature.
The model of learning developed in the paper is shown to maintain much of the tractability of Shannon’s
standard measure, and also provides a new foundation for non-compensatory behavior, whereby an option’s value
being increased, ceteris paribus, can result in a lower chance of it being selected. Non-compensatory choice
rules are significant in the marketing literature, have important implications for revealed preference analysis, and
cannot be generated with a model of RI that uses Shannon Entropy to measure uncertainty.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Lemma 1. If Pb is a binary partition, then the only learning strategy S such that σ(S) = σ(Pb),
is S = (Pb). Thus, for any µ, all learning strategies S such that σ(S) = σ(Pb) have the same expected cost
C(S, µ) = C(Pb, µ). 
Proof of Lemma 2. Since Pi = (A1, . . . , Am) is learning strategy invariant, if Pj = (A
j
1, . . . , A
j
mj
) is another
partition such that Pj 6= Pi, and σ(Pj , Pi) = σ(Pi), then Pj is also learning strategy invariant due to Axiom 1.
Further, Axiom 1 and Axiom 5 tell us:
C(Pi, µ) = C(Pj , µ) + E[C(Pi, µ(·|Pj(ω)))] = C(Pi, µ) + E[C(Pj , µ(·|Pi(ω)))]
=⇒ λjc(µ(A
j
1), . . . , µ(A
j
mj
)) + E[λic(µ(A1|Pj(ω)), . . . , µ(Am|Pj(ω)))]
= λic(µ(A1), . . . , µ(Am)) + E[λjc(µ(A
j
1|Pi(ω)), . . . , µ(A
j
mj
|Pi(ω)))]
Since this is true for all µ, it is true if µ assigns probability 1/2 to two events in each of Pi and Pj such that
knowing the realized event of one of Pi and Pj tells you the realized event of the other. Thus:
λic(1/2, 1/2) + λjc(1) = λjc(1/2, 1/2) + λic(1).
Then, since Axiom 3 implies c(1) < c(1/2, 1/2), it must be that λi = λj . Since this is true for all such Pj, the
function c satisfies Shannon’s (1948) Axiom 3, as well as Axiom 2, Axiom 3, Axiom 4, and Axiom 5.
The rest of the proof follows the work of Shannon (1948) closely. Define h so h(n) ≡ c(1/n, . . . , 1/n).
Shannon’s (1948) Axiom 3 implies h(sm) = m · h(s), which is reminiscent of logarithms. Given arbitrarily small
ǫ > 0, and integers s and t, pick n and m so that 2/n < ǫ, and sm ≤ tn < sm+1. So:
m log(s) ≤ n log(t) < (m+ 1) log(s) =⇒
m
n
≤
log(t)
log(s)
<
m+ 1
n
=⇒ |m
n
−
log(t)
log(s)
| < 1
n
.
Axiom 3 then tell us:
h(sm) ≤ h(tn) < h(sm+1) =⇒ m · h(s) ≤ n · h(t) < (m+ 1)h(s) =⇒
m
n
≤
h(t)
h(s)
<
m+ 1
n
=⇒ |m
n
−
h(t)
h(s)
| < 1
n
.
All of this tells us:
|h(t)
h(s)
−
log(t)
log(s)
| < ǫ,
and thus h(n) = K log(n), where K must be a positive constant to satisfy Axiom 3. In our context it is without
loss to assume K = 1, since we can just rescale the associated multiplier λi for each learning strategy invariant
partition Pi.
Let pi = µ(Ai) for each Ai ∈ Pi. Suppose, for now, that each pi is a rational number. Then there exists
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integers n1, . . . , nm, such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m} we have:
pi =
ni
m∑
j=1
nj
.
Our interpretation is that we have a uniform distribution over
∑
i
ni equally likely states, and the chance of the
event which happens with probability pi is the chance of one of the ni associated states occurring. Then using
Shannon’s Axiom 3:
c
(
1∑
i
ni
, . . . ,
1∑
i
ni
)
= h
(
m∑
i=1
ni
)
= log
(
m∑
i=1
ni
)
= c(p1, . . . , pm) +
m∑
i=1
pi log(ni),
=⇒ c(p1, . . . , pm) = log
(
m∑
i=1
ni
)
−
m∑
i=1
pi log(ni) =
m∑
j=1
(
pj log
(
m∑
i=1
ni
))
−
m∑
i=1
pi log(ni)
= −
m∑
i=1
pi log
(
ni∑
j
nj
)
= −
m∑
i=1
pi log(pi) = H(Pi, µ),
where H is defined as in equation (1). If any of the pi are irrational, then the density of the rationals and Axiom 4
can be used to get the same result. The learning strategy invariance of Pi, and Axiom 5, thus give us:
C∗(Pi, µ) = C(Pi, µ) = λic(µ(A
i
1), . . . , µ(A
i
mi
)) = λiH(Pi, µ).
Mutual Information
Consider two partitions P1 and P2. Given some probability measure µ, define the mutual information
between P1 and P2, denoted I(P1, P2, µ), to be:
I(P1, P2, µ) =
∑
a1∈P1
∑
a2∈P2
µ(a1 ∩ a2) log
( µ(a1 ∩ a2)
µ(a1)µ(a2)
)
Then, as is well known in the literature:
H(×{Pi}
2
i=1, µ) = H(P1, µ) +H(P2, µ)− I(P1, P2, µ)
= E[H(P1, µ(·|P2(ω)))]
=
H(P1, µ)−I(P1,P2, µ)
+ I(P1, P2, µ) + E[H(P2, µ(·|P1(ω)))]
=
H(P2, µ)−I(P1,P2, µ)
= H(P1, µ) + E[H(P2, µ(·|P1(ω)))] = H(P2, µ) + E[H(P1, µ(·|P2(ω)))]
and note that the strict concavity of H means that I(P1, P2, µ) ≥ 0.
Mutual information can be thought of as the information that is double counted if one were to compute
the total uncertainty about the outcome of P1 and P2 by simply adding up the uncertainty about the outcome
36
of P1 and the uncertainty about the outcome of P2. When the mutual information increases and the individual
uncertainty about the outcome of P1 and the outcome of P2 are held constant the total uncertainty about the
outcome of P1 and P2 decreases because the amount that remains to be learned after observing one of the
outcomes of either P1 or P2 decreases.
Mutual information can be acquired by learning the value of either P1 or P2. When we think of an
agent that is trying to acquire information in an efficient fashion, we should always envision them acquiring
mutual information from the cheapest source, by learning about whichever of P1 and P2 has the lowest associated
multiplier. This logic is formalized by the result in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. If C satisfies our five axioms, and Sb = {Pb1, . . . , P
b
i , P
b
i+1, . . . , P
b
m} and S˜
b = {Pb1 , . . . , P
b
i+1, P
b
i , . . . , P
b
m}
are two binary learning strategies such that Pbi and P
b
i+1’s associated multipliers are ordered λi ≥ λi+1, then for
all probability measures µ:
C(Sb, µ) ≥ C(S˜b, µ).
Proof. For all realizations of ∩i−1j=1P
b
j (ω):
C((Pbi , P
b
i+1), µ(·| ∩
i−1
j=1 P
b
j (ω))) = λiH(P
b
i , µ(·| ∩
i−1
j=1 P
b
j (ω))) + λi+1E[H(P
b
i+1, µ(·| ∩
i
j=1 P
b
j (ω)))]
= λiH(P
b
i , µ(·| ∩
i−1
j=1 P
b
j (ω))) + λi+1
(
H(Pbi+1, µ(·| ∩
i−1
j=1 P
b
j (ω)))− I(P
b
i , P
b
i+1, µ(·| ∩
i−1
j=1 P
b
j (ω))
)
≥ λi
(
H(Pbi , µ(·| ∩
i−1
j=1 P
b
j (ω)))− I(P
b
i , P
b
i+1, µ(·| ∩
i−1
j=1 P
b
j (ω))
)
+ λi+1H(P
b
i+1, µ(·| ∩
i−1
j=1 P
b
j (ω)))
= λi+1H(P
b
i+1, µ(·| ∩
i−1
j=1 P
b
j (ω))) + λiE[H(P
b
i , µ(·|(∩
i−1
j=1P
b
j (ω)) ∩ P
b
i+1(ω)))] = C((P
b
i+1, P
b
i ), µ(·| ∩
i−1
j=1 P
b
j (ω))).
It is thus always weakly cheaper in expectation to have Pi+1 before Pi since switching their order does not
change the expected cost of implementing the binary partitions before or after the pair.
Proof of Theorem 1. Given some probability measure µ, suppose Sb is a binary learning strategy such that
σ(Sb) = F , and C(Sb, µ) = C∗(Ω, µ). We know such binary learning strategy exists whenever C satisfies
Axiom 2. We may assume that if Pbi and P
b
i+1 are in S
b with associated multipliers λi and λi+1, that λi ≤ λi+1.
If not, then their order can be reversed and the resultant strategy is weakly less costly, as is shown in Lemma 4.
If for any j ∈ {1, . . . , M}, multiplier λj ’s associated binary partitions Pbi , . . . ,P
b
i+k in S
b are such that
σ(Pbi , . . . ,P
b
i+k) 6= σ(P
b
λj
), then there are binary partitions Pbm+1, . . . , P
b
m+l with associated multiplier λj , such
that σ(Pbi , . . . ,P
b
i+k, Pm+1, . . . , P
b
m+l) = σ(P
b
λj
). Pbm+1, . . . , P
b
m+l can be appended to the end of S
b, and the
resultant strategy S˜b is also such that C(S˜b, µ) = C∗(Ω, µ). This is true since each appended binary partition
has an expected cost of zero, since σ(Sb) = F . Lemma 4 then implies that if we reorder S˜b so that the new
learning strategy Sˆ’s binary partitions are ordered by their multipliers, then: C(Sˆb, µ) = C∗(Ω, µ). We can thus
assume that Sb is such that for any j ∈ {1, . . . , M} multiplier λj ’s associated binary partitions Pbi , . . . ,P
b
i+k in
Sb are such that σ(Pbi , . . . ,P
b
i+k) = σ(Pλj ).
For each j ∈ {1, . . . , M} we thus have that if all binary partitions Pbi , . . . ,P
b
i+k in S
b with multiplier λj
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are taken together that:
E[C((Pbi , . . . ,P
b
i+k), µ(·| ∩
i−1
t=1 P
b
t (ω)))] = E
[ i+k∑
l=i
λjH(P
b
l , µ(·| ∩
l−1
t=1 P
b
t (ω)))
]
= E[λjH(Pλj , µ(·| ∩
i−1
t=1 P
b
t (ω)))] = E[λjH(Pλj , µ(·| ∩
j−1
t=1 Pλt(ω)))].
Where the second equality holds due to the properties of H. This procedure can be carried out for all µ. Thus:
C∗(Ω, µ) = C(Sb, µ) = λ1H
(
Pλ1 , µ
)
+E
[
λ2H
(
Pλ2 , µ(·|Pλ1(ω))
)
+ · · ·+ λMH
(
PλM , µ(·|∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω))
)]
.
Appendix 2
Proof of Lemma 3. In Lemma 3, we show that we can rewrite the agent’s problem in terms of selecting the
choice probabilities described in equations (4), (5), and (6). To do this, we first establish several other lemmas.
In Lemma 5, we show that C∗(Ω, µ) is a strictly concave function of µ. This is a commonly known property of
Shannon Entropy, but needs to be established for C∗. This implies that C is strictly convex. We then show, in
Lemma 6, that, given the convexity of C, any selected action is associated with a particular posterior probability.
This is desirable because it allows us to reduce the strategies considered to recommendation strategies. That is,
we are able to focus on signals that are simply a recommendation of an option. In Lemma 7, we show that we
may rewrite the cost function in terms of the choice probabilities in equations (4), (5), and (6).
Lemma 5. C∗(Ω, µ) is a strictly concave function of µ. Namely, if there are probability measures µa, and µb,
such that µ = αµa + (1− α)µb for some α ∈ (0, 1), and µa 6= µb, then:
C∗(Ω, µ) > αC∗(Ω, µa) + (1− α)C
∗(Ω, µb).
Proof. For each probability measure µ, i ∈ {1, . . . , M}, and realization of ∩i−1j=1Pλj (ω), the strict concavity of
Shannon Entropy (Mateˇjka & McKay, 2015; Caplin et al., 2017) implies:
H(Pλi , µ(·| ∩
i−1
j=1 Pλj (ω))) ≥ αH(Pλi , µa(·| ∩
i−1
j=1 Pλj (ω))) + (1− α)H(Pλi , µb(·| ∩
i−1
j=1 Pλj (ω))).
The inequality is also strict for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , M} since µa 6= µb. The desired result thus follows from
Theorem 1.
Lemma 6. If action n ∈ N is selected with positive probability, Pr(n) > 0, as the outcome of information
strategy F with is a solution to (2) subject to (3), then there exists a posterior belief Bn such that F (ω|s) = Bn
with probability one whenever n is selected.
Proof. It is impossible that there are two distinct sets of signals S1n and S
2
n which are observed with strictly
positive probability, both of which lead to the selection of n, and induce different posteriors F (ω|s1) 6= F (ω|s2)
for s1 ∈ S1n and s2 ∈ S
2
n. C
∗ is strictly concave, so the agent could thus do better by replacing their original
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information strategy F with a new information strategy F˜ which is identical to F except the signals in S1n and
S2n are replaced by s0: ∀ω ∈ Ω let F˜ (s0|ω) =
∫
s∈S1n
F (s|ω) +
∫
s∈S2n
F (s|ω). This is true because payoffs are linear,
and the law of iterated expectations implies the agent still picks n after s0 is realized since ∀ ν ∈ N :
EF˜ [vn(ω)|s0] =
∑
ω∈Ω
∫
s∈S1n
F (s|ω)µ(ω)
∑
ω∈Ω
( ∫
s∈S1n
F (s|ω)µ(ω) +
∫
s∈S2n
F (s|ω)µ(ω)
)EF [vn(ω)|s ∈ S1n]
+
∑
ω∈Ω
∫
s∈S2n
F (s|ω)µ(ω)
∑
ω∈Ω
( ∫
s∈S2n
F (s|ω)µ(ω) +
∫
s∈S2n
F (s|ω)µ(ω)
)EF [vn(ω)|s ∈ S2n]
≥
∑
ω∈Ω
∫
s∈S1n
F (s|ω)µ(ω)
∑
ω∈Ω
( ∫
s∈S1n
F (s|ω)µ(ω) +
∫
s∈S2n
F (s|ω)µ(ω)
)EF [vν(ω)|s ∈ S1n]
+
∑
ω∈Ω
∫
s∈S2n
F (s|ω)µ(ω)
∑
ω∈Ω
( ∫
s∈S2n
F (s|ω)µ(ω) +
∫
s∈S2n
F (s|ω)µ(ω)
)EF [vν(ω)|s ∈ S2] = EF˜ [vν(ω)|s0].
.
Lemma 7. The cost of information for a given strategy in equation (2) can be written:
C(F (s, ω), µ) = C(P, µ) =
∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)
∑
n∈N
(
− λ1Pr(n) log(Pr(n)) − (λ2 − λ1)Pr(n|Pλ1(ω)) log(Pr(n|Pλ1(ω)))
−(λ3 − λ2)Pr(n|Pλ1(ω) ∩ Pλ2(ω)) log(Pr(n|Pλ1(ω) ∩ Pλ2(ω)))
− . . . − (λM − λM−1)Pr(n| ∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω)) log(Pr(n| ∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω))) + λMPr(n|ω) log(Pr(n|ω))
)
.
Proof. Let Ps = (S1, . . . , Sn) denote a partition of the space of signals the agent may receive. We then have:
C(F (s, ω), µ) = E[C∗(Ω, µ)− C∗(Ω, µ(·|s))]
= E
[
λ1
(
H(Pλ1 , µ)−H(Pλ1 , µ(·|s))
)
(11)
+ . . . + λM
(
H(PλM , µ(·| ∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω)))−H(PλM , µ(·| ∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω), s))
)]
= E
[
λ1
(
H(Ps, F (s))−H(Ps, F (s|Pλ1(ω)))
)
(12)
+ . . . + λM
(
H(Ps, F (s| ∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω))) −H(Ps, F (s| ∩
M
i=1 Pλi(ω)))
)]
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= E
[
λ1H(Ps, F (s)) + (λ2 − λ1)H(Ps, F (s|Pλ1(ω)))
+ . . . + (λM − λM−1)H(Ps, F (s| ∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω)))− λMH(Ps, F (s| ∩
M
i=1 Pλi(ω)))
]
=
∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)
∑
n∈N
(
− λ1Pr(n) log(Pr(n))− (λ2 − λ1)Pr(n|Pλ1(ω)) log(Pr(n|Pλ1(ω)))
−(λ3 − λ2)Pr(n|Pλ1(ω) ∩ Pλ2(ω)) log(Pr(n|Pλ1(ω) ∩ Pλ2(ω)))
− . . . − (λM − λM−1)Pr(n| ∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω)) log(Pr(n| ∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω))) + λMPr(n|ω) log(Pr(n|ω))
)
.
The equality of (11) and (12) follows from the symmetry of mutual information, defined in Appendix 1. 
We now resume our proof of Lemma 3. For each n ∈ N , let sn denote some signal in Sn. Then notice:
∑
ω∈Ω
∫
s
V (s)F (ds|ω)µ(ω) =
∑
n∈N
V (sn)
∫
s∈Sn
∑
ω∈Ω
F (ds|ω)µ(ω)
=
∑
n∈N
V (sn)Pr(n) =
∑
n∈N
∑
ω∈Ω
vn(ω)F (ω|sn)Pr(n)
=
∑
n∈N
∑
ω∈Ω
vn(ω)Pr(n|ω)µ(ω)
Where the last step follows from the fact that Pr(X |Y )Pr(Y ) = Pr(Y |X)Pr(X). We now proceed with two proofs
by contradiction. First, assume that (F, a) is a solution to (2) subject to (3), which achieves expected utility U1,
and let P be the choice probabilities induced by it. Assume that P is not a solution to (7) subject to (8) and
(9), and thus there is a P˜ which satisfies (8) and (9) and achieves expected utility U2 > U1. However, a strategy
pairing (F˜ , a˜) can be created that generates P˜. For instance, for each of N distinct signals sn, let a˜(F˜ (ω|sn)) ≡ n,
and let F˜ (sn, ω) = P˜r(n|ω)µ(ω) ∀ω so that (3) is satisfied. This is impossible though as then (F˜ , a˜) achieves
U2 > U1 and (F, a) cannot have been optimal.
Similarly, assume that P is a solution to (7) subject to (8) and (9), which achieves expected utility U3 and
but is not induced by a solution to 2 subject to (3). That is there is a F˜ which satisfies (3) and achieves U4 > U3.
This means, however, that P˜r(n|ω) =
F˜ (sn, ω)
µ(ω)
also achieves U4, which is impossible as P was supposedly optimal
and P˜ satisfies (8) and (9). 
Proof of Theorem 2. The Lagrangian for the above problem can be written:
L =
∑
n∈N
∑
ω∈Ω
vn(ω)Pr(n|ω)µ(ω)−C(P, µ) +
∑
n∈N
∑
ω∈Ω
ξn(ω)Pr(n|ω)µ(ω)−
∑
ω∈Ω
γ(ω)
( ∑
n∈N
Pr(n|ω)− 1
)
µ(ω)
Where ξn(ω) ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers for (8), and γ(ω) are the multipliers for (9). If Pr(n) = 0, then
Pr(n|ω) = 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω. If Pr(n| ∩mi=1 Pλi(ω)) = 0 for some m ∈ {1, . . . , M − 1}, then Pr(n|ω) = 0 ∀ω. If Pr(n) > 0,
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and Pr(n| ∩mi=1 Pλi(ω)) > 0, ∀m ∈ {1, . . . , M − 1}, then the first order condition with respect to Pr(n|ω) implies:
vn(ω) + λ1(1 + logPr(n)) + (λ2 − λ1)(1 + logPr(n|Pλ1(ω)))
+ . . . + (λM − λM−1)(1 + logPr(n| ∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω)))− λM (1 + logPr(n|ω)) = γ(ω)− ξn(ω)
which then implies Pr(n|ω) > 0 and ξn(ω) = 0, because if not, and Pr(n|ω) = 0, then since ξn(ω) ≥ 0, equality
of the first order condition then necessitates γ(ω) = ∞. This is impossible, however, since then ∀ ν ∈ N their
respective first order conditions holding necessitates Pr(ν|ω) = 0. This being true ∀ ν ∈ N of course then violates
(9). Thus, the first order condition implies:
Pr(n|ω) = Pr(n)
λ1
λM Pr(n|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . Pr(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM e
−γ(ω)
λM (13)
Plugging (13) into (9), one can solve for γ(ω). Plugging γ(ω) back into (13) achieves the desired result.
Proof of Corollary 1. Plug equation (10) into equation (7). 
Proof of Theorem 3. A fixed effect interpretation of MSSE follows easily from the optimal choice probabilities
described in Theorem 2:
Pr(n|ω) =
Pr(n)
λ1
λM Pr(n|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . Pr(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM∑
ν∈N
Pr(ν)
λ1
λM Pr(ν|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . Pr(ν| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λM−λN−1
λM e
vν (ω)
λM
=
NPr(n)
λ1
λM Pr(n|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . Pr(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM
N
∑
ν∈N
Pr(ν)
λ1
λM Pr(ν|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . Pr(ν| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λM−λN−1
λM e
vν(ω)
λM
=
(NPr(n))
λ1
λM (NPr(n|Pλ1(ω)))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . (NPr(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω)))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM∑
ν∈N
(NPr(ν))
λ1
λM (NPr(ν|Pλ1(ω)))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . (NPr(ν| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω)))
λM−λN−1
λM e
vν (ω)
λM
=
e
vn(ω)+λ1α
0
n+(λ2−λ1)α
1
n+···+(λM−λM−1)α
M−1
n
λM∑
ν∈N
e
vν (ω)+λ1α
0
ν+(λ2−λ1)α
1
ν+···+(λM−λM−1)α
M−1
ν
λM
Where α0ν = log(NPr(ν)), and for m ∈ {1, . . . , M − 1} we have α
m
ν = log(NPr(ν| ∩
m
i=1 Pλi(ω))). Normalizing
the value of the options by λM , namely letting v˜n =
vn(ω)
λM
, and defining αn appropriately, agent choice behavior
described by rational inattention with MSSE can then be interpreted as a RU model where each option n has
perceived value:
un = v˜n +
λ1
λM
α0n +
λ2−λ1
λM
α1n + · · ·+
λM−λM−1
λM
αM−1n + ǫn = v˜n + αn + ǫn
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The only kind of RU model consistent with this behavior is one where ǫn is distributed iid according to a Gumbel
distribution (Train, 2009). 
Proof of Proposition 1. Proposition 1 in this paper is implied by Proposition 1 in Caplin et al. (2018). Proof
follows for those that are interested. The Lagrangian for the problem described in Corollary 1 when the set of
alternatives is N is:
L =
(∑
ω∈Ω
log
( ∑
n∈N
Pr(n)e
vn(ω)
λ
)
µ(ω)
)
+
∑
n∈N
ξnPr(n)− γ
( ∑
n∈N
Pr(n)− 1
)
The objective is concave since payoffs are linear and research costs are convex. The objective is also differentiable.
The Karush-Khun Tucker conditions are thus necessary and sufficient for an optimal solution (Lange, 2013).
Taking first order conditions with respect to Pr(n) gives:
∑
ω∈Ω
(
e
vn(ω)
λ∑
ν∈N
Pr(ν)e
vν (ω)
λ
µ(ω)
)
+ ξn = γ
Further, for each n ∈ N with Pr(n) > 0, which there must be at least one of, ξn = 0 and Theorem 2 implies:
∑
ω∈Ω
Pr(n|ω)µ(ω) = Pr(n) =⇒
∑
ω∈Ω
Pr(n)e
vn(ω)
λ∑
ν∈N
Pr(ν)e
vν(ω)
λ
µ(ω) = Pr(n) =⇒
∑
ω∈Ω
e
vn(ω)
λ∑
ν∈N
Pr(ν)e
vν (ω)
λ
µ(ω) = 1
Which thus implies γ = 1. If: ∑
ω∈Ω
(
e
vx(ω)
λ∑
ν∈N
Pr(ν)e
vν(ω)
λ
µ(ω)
)
> 1
then Pr(x) = 0 cannot be optimal since ξx ≥ 0, and thus Pr(x) > 0. Further, if Pr(x) = 0 is optimal, then since
ξx ≥ 0, it must be that: ∑
ω∈Ω
(
e
vx(ω)
λ∑
ν∈N
Pr(ν)e
vν (ω)
λ
µ(ω)
)
≤ 1
Proof of Proposition 3. The Lagrangian for the problem described in Corollary 1 is:
L =
∑
ω∈Ω
(
log
( N∑
n=1
Pr(n)
λ1
λM Pr(n|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . Pr(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM
)
µ(ω)
)
+
∑
A∈×{Pλi}
M−1
i=1
∑
n∈N
ξn(A)Pr(n|A)−
∑
A∈×{Pλi}
M−1
i=1
γ(A)
( ∑
n∈N
Pr(n|A) − 1
)
Using Theorem 2, the first order condition with respect to Pr(n|A) for some A ∈ ×{Pλi}
M−1
i=1 and ω˜ ∈ A is then:
(∑
ω∈Ω
λ1µ(∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω˜))
λMPr(n)
Pr(n|ω)µ(ω)
)
+
( ∑
ω∈Pλ1(ω˜)
(λ2 − λ1)µ(∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω˜))
λMPr(n|Pλ1(ω))µ(Pλ1(ω˜))
Pr(n|ω)µ(ω)
)
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+ · · ·+
( ∑
ω∈∩M−1
i=1 Pλi (ω˜)
(λM − λM−1)µ(∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω˜))
λMPr(n| ∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω))µ(∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω˜))
Pr(n|ω)µ(ω)
)
+ ξn(A) = γ(A)
For n ∈ N with Pr(n|A) > 0, which there must be at least one of, ξn(A) = 0, and:
∑
ω∈Ω
λ1µ(∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω˜))
λMPr(n)
Pr(n|ω)µ(ω) =
λ1µ(A)
λM
,
and for for each m ∈ {1, . . . , M − 1}:
∑
ω∈∩m
i=1Pλi (ω˜)
(λm+1 − λm)µ(∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω˜))
λMPr(n| ∩mi=1 Pλi(ω))µ(∩
m
i=1Pλi(ω˜))
Pr(n|ω)µ(ω) =
(λm+1 − λm)µ(A)
λM
.
This tells us:
γ(A) = µ(A)
( λ1
λM
+
λ2 − λ1
λM
+ · · ·+
λM − λM−1
λM
)
= µ(A), ∀A ∈ ×{Pλi}
M−1
i=1 .
The rest of the proof proceeds as a proof by contradiction. Assume there is an alternative n ∈ N such
that Pr(n) > 0, and ∃A ∈ ×{Pλi}
M−1
i=1 such that Pr(n|A) = 0. This means for some ω˜ ∈ A there is a m ∈
{1, . . . , M − 1} such that Pr(n| ∩mi=1 Pλi(ω˜)) = 0 and Pr(n| ∩
m−1
i=1 Pλi(ω˜)) > 0. The first order condition with
respect to Pr(n|A) is thus:
(∑
ω∈Ω
λ1µ(∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω˜))
λMPr(n)
Pr(n|ω)µ(ω)
)
+
( ∑
ω∈Pλ1(ω˜)
(λ2 − λ1)µ(∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω˜))
λMPr(n|Pλ1(ω))µ(Pλ1(ω˜))
Pr(n|ω)µ(ω)
)
+ · · ·+
( ∑
ω∈∩m−1
i=1 Pλi (ω˜)
(λm − λm−1)µ(∩
M−1
i=1 Pλi(ω˜))
λMPr(n| ∩
m−1
i=1 Pλi(ω))µ(∩
m−1
i=1 Pλi(ω˜))
Pr(n|ω)µ(ω)
)
+
(∑
ω∈A
(λM − λm)
λMPr(n|A)
λm
λM
Pr(n)
λ1
λM Pr(n|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . .Pr(n| ∩m−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λm−λm−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM∑
ν∈N
Pr(ν)
λ1
λM Pr(ν|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . .Pr(ν| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vν (ω)
λM
µ(ω)
)
·
((µ(∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω˜))
µ(∩mi=1Pλi(ω˜))
)λm+1−λm
λM · · · · ·
(µ(∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω˜))
µ(∩M−2i=1 Pλi(ω˜))
)λM−1−λM−2
λM
)
+ ξn(A) = µ(A),
which is impossible since ξn(A) ≥ 0, and the last sum is infinite since Pr(n|A) = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We showed in the proof for Proposition 3 that γ(A) = µ(A) ∀A ∈ ×{Pλi}
M−1
i=1 . The
Lagrangian for the problem described in Corollary 1 when the set of alternatives is N is thus:
L =
(∑
ω∈Ω
log
( ∑
n∈N
Pr(n)
λ1
λM Pr(n|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . .Pr(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM
+Pr(x)
λ1
λM Pr(x|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . .Pr(x| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vx(ω)
λM
)
µ(ω)
)
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+
∑
A∈×{Pλi}
M−1
i=1
∑
n∈N˜
ξn(A)Pr(n|A)−
∑
A∈×{Pλi}
M−1
i=1
µ(A)
( ∑
n∈N˜
Pr(n|A)− 1
)
In this case the Karush-Khun-Tucker conditions are necessary, but they are not always sufficient since at corner
solutions our objective is not differentiable, even though the partials all exist (Lange, 2013). When considering
the validity of a corner where Pr(x) = 0, we must bound away from Pr(x) = 0 and let the difference go to zero to
ensure differentiability. ∀B ∈ ×{Pλi}
M−1
i=1 , let P˜r(x|B) = ǫ > 0, and ∀n ∈ N let P˜r(n|B) = Pr(n|B) − ǫ/N > 0.
We, assuming without loss that prior to the introduction of x that all options were being considered, and picking
ǫ small enough, can then write the Lagrangian:
L =
(∑
ω∈Ω
log
( ∑
n∈N˜
P˜r(n)
λ1
λM P˜r(n|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . P˜r(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM
+
∑
A∈×{Pλi}
M−1
i=1
∑
n∈N˜
ξn(A)
(
P˜r(n|A) − ǫ
)
−
∑
A∈×{Pλi}
M−1
i=1
µ(A)
( ∑
n∈N˜
P˜r(n|A) − 1
)
The first order condition with respect to Pr(x|B) gives:
λ1
λM
(∑
ω∈Ω
e
vx(ω)
λM µ(B)∑
n∈N˜
P˜r(n)
λ1
λM (P˜r(n|Pλ1(ω)))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . (P˜r(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω)))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM
µ(ω)
)
+
λ2 − λ1
λM
( ∑
ω∈Pλ1 (ω˜)
e
vx(ω)
λM µ(B)∑
n∈N˜
P˜r(n)
λ1
λM (P˜r(n|Pλ1(ω)))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . (P˜r(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω)))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM
µ(ω|Pλ1(ω˜))
)
+ . . . +
λM − λM−1
λM
(∑
ω∈B
e
vx(ω)
λM µ(B)∑
n∈N˜
P˜r(n)
λ1
λM (P˜r(n|Pλ1(ω)))
λ2−λ1
λM . . . (P˜r(n| ∩M−1i=1 Pλi(ω)))
λM−λM−1
λM e
vn(ω)
λM
µ(ω|B)
)
+ ξx(B) = µ(B).
Which establishes the desired results when ǫ goes to zero since ξx(B) ≥ 0. 
Appendix 3
Example 6
Consider an environment where an agent is faced with a screen that shows 100 balls, each of which is either
red or blue. The agent is offered a prize which they may either accept (option 1) or reject for a payoff of zero
(option 2). The agent is told that if the majority of the balls on the screen are blue then the prize is y ∈ R++,
and if the majority of the balls on the screen are red then the prize is −y.
The agent is then told that there is a 1/6 chance that 60 of the balls are blue and 40 of the balls are red
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Table 6: Example 6
State: ω1 ω2 ω3
Balls in State: 60 Blue & 40 Red 55 Blue & 44 Red 51 Blue & 49 Red
Probability: 1/6 1/6 1/6
Value of selecting option 1: y y y
Value of selecting option 2: 0 0 0
State: ω4 ω5 ω6
Balls in State: 49 Blue & 51 Red 45 Blue & 55 Red 40 Blue & 60 Red
Probability: 1/6 1/6 1/6
Value of selecting option 1: -y -y -y
Value of selecting option 2: 0 0 0
(prize is y), a 1/6 chance that 55 of the balls are blue and 45 of the balls are red (prize is y), a 1/6 chance that
51 of the balls are blue and 49 of the balls are red (prize is y), a 1/6 chance that 49 of the balls are blue and 51
of the balls are red (prize is −y), a 1/6 chance that 45 of the balls are blue and 55 of the balls are red (prize is
−y), and a 1/6 chance that 40 of the balls are blue and 60 of the balls are red (prize is −y). Table 6 describes
this environment.
Differentiating between the state where there are 60 blue balls and the state where there are 40 blue balls
should be less costly than differentiating between the state where there are 55 blue balls and the state where
there are 45 blue balls, which in turn should be less costly than differentiating between the state where there are
51 blue balls and the state where there are 49 blue balls. It should thus be easier for the agent to answer the
question ‘Are 60 of the balls blue?’ than it is be for them to answer ‘Are 55 or more of the balls blue?’, which
in turn should be easier than answering ‘Are 51 or more of the balls blue?’. Similarly, it should be easier for the
agent to answer the question ‘Are 60 of the balls red?’ than it is for them to answer ‘Are 55 or more of the balls
red?’, which in turn should be easier than answering ‘Are 51 or more of the balls red?’. Symmetry also means
that the questions ‘Are 60 of the balls blue?’ and ‘Are 60 of the balls red?’ should have the same expected cost,
the questions ‘Are 55 or more of the balls blue?’ and ‘Are 55 or more of the balls red?’ should have the same
expected cost, and the questions ‘Are 51 or more of the balls blue?’ and ‘Are 51 or more of the balls red?’ should
have the same expected cost. We can thus assume Pλ1 = {A1, A2, A3} = {{ω1}, {ω2 ∪ ω3 ∪ ω4 ∪ ω5}, {ω6}},
Pλ2 = {B1, B2, B3} = {{ω1 ∪ ω2}, {ω3 ∪ ω4}, {ω5 ∪ ω6}}, and Pλ3 = {{ω1 ∪ ω2 ∪ ω3}, {ω4 ∪ ω5 ∪ ω6}}.
Solutions to Corollary 1 in this environment for a range of different λ1 and λ2 can be found in Figure 7.
When λ1 is small relative to λ3, the agent chooses option 1 in state ω1 with a high probability, and choose option
2 in state ω6 with a high probability. As λ1 approaches λ3, the agent becomes more likely to choose option 2
in state ω1, and becomes more likely to choose option 1 in state ω6. Similarly, as λ2 approaches λ3, the agent
becomes more likely to choose option 2 in state ω2, and becomes more likely to choose option 1 in state ω5.
payoffs are the same in the environments depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 7. The range of multipliers
associated with observing 60 blue balls is the same in the environments depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 7. The
range of multipliers associated with observing 40 blue balls is the same in the environments depicted in Figure 1
and Figure 7. It is thus not surprising that Pr(1|A1) and Pr(1|A3) are the same in both environments.
In Example 6, as with Example 1, solutions to Corollary 1 combined with the result of Theorem 2 mean
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Solutions to Corollary 1 for Example 6:
y=1, 
3
=1, 
2
=(
1
+
3
)/2
Pr(1)=Pr(1|A2)=Pr(1|A2 B2)=Pr(2)=Pr(2|A2)=Pr(2|A2 B2)
Pr(1|A2 B3)=Pr(2|A2 B1)
Pr(1|A3)=Pr(1|A3 B3)=Pr(2|A1)=Pr(2|A1 B1)
Pr(1|A1)=Pr(1|A1 B1)=Pr(2|A3)=Pr(2|A3 B3)
Pr(1|A2 B1)=Pr(2|A2 B3)
that the chance of the agent selecting option 1 is increasing in the number of blue balls:
Pr(1|ω1) =
1
1 + (Pr(2|A1)Pr(1|A1) )
λ2−λ1
λ3 (Pr(2|A1∩B1)Pr(1|A1∩B1) )
λ3−λ2
λ3 e
−y
λ3
>
1
1 + (Pr(2|A2)Pr(1|A2) )
λ2−λ1
λ3 (Pr(2|A2∩B1)Pr(1|A2∩B1) )
λ3−λ2
λ3 e
−y
λ3
= Pr(1|ω2)
> Pr(1|ω3) =
1
1 + (Pr(2|A2)Pr(1|A2) )
λ2−λ1
λ3 (Pr(2|A2∩B2)Pr(1|A2∩B2) )
λ3−λ2
λ3 e
−y
λ3
>
1
1 + (Pr(2|A2)Pr(1|A2) )
λ2−λ1
λ3 (Pr(2|A2∩B2)Pr(1|A2∩B2) )
λ3−λ2
λ3 e
y
λ3
= Pr(1|ω4)
> Pr(1|ω5) =
1
1 + (Pr(2|A2)Pr(1|A2) )
λ2−λ1
λ3 (Pr(2|A2∩B3)Pr(1|A2∩B3) )
λ3−λ2
λ3 e
y
λ3
>
1
1 + (Pr(2|A3)Pr(1|A3) )
λ2−λ1
λ3 (Pr(2|A3∩B3)Pr(1|A3∩B3) )
λ3−λ2
λ3 e
y
λ3
= Pr(1|ω6).
This is supported by the experimental work of Dean and Neligh (2018), and is in contrast with what is be predicted
by a model which uses Shannon Entropy. A model which uses Shannon Entropy, and imposes invariance under
compression onto optimal behavior, predicts that the agent has the same chance of selecting option 1 in states
ω1, ω2, and ω3, as they have the same payoffs, and the same chance of selecting option 1 in states ω4, ω5, and
ω6, as they have the same payoffs.
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Example 7
At the end of Section 5.2 we claimed that in the limit MSSE can generate continuous changes in behavior
at places where payoffs change discontinuously. We now prove that claim.
Consider an environment where an agent is faced with a screen that has a line segment of length one on
it, and a visible dot somewhere on the line segment. The agent is offered a prize that they may either accept
(option 1) or reject (option 2), whose value depends on the location of the dot. Suppose that if the dot is on the
left side of the line segment, in the interval [0, 1/2), that the prize has value −y < 0, and that if the dot is on
the right side of the line segment, in the interval (1/2, 1], that the prize has value y > 0. If the agent rejects the
prize they get a payoff of zero. Suppose that the agent also knows that the dot is drawn uniformly from the unit
interval with the midpoint removed, the set [0, 1]\{1/2}.
How can we model this continuous environment with MSSE? Suppose we were to divide the unit interval into
2M line segments of equal length, denoted {ti}2Mi=1 for some natural numberM : t
i = [ i−12M ,
i
2M ) for i ∈ {1, . . . , M},
and ti = ( i−12M ,
i
2M ] for i ∈ {M + 1, . . . , 2M}. Increasing M can thus been seen as analogous to increasing the
number of pixels on the screen. The difficulty of differentiating between t1+j and t2M−j should be increasing in j
for j ∈ {0, . . . , M − 1}, since the perceptual distance between two such segments is decreasing in such a j. Based
on symmetry, we can then define:
Pλj = {{∪
j
i=1t
i}, {∪2M−ji=j+1t
i}, {∪2Mi=2M−j+1t
i}}, for j ∈ {1, . . . , M − 1}, and PλM = {{∪
M
i=1t
i}, {∪2Mi=M+1t
i}}.
The intuition expressed in Morris and Yang (2016) is that it should become infinitely costly to differentiate
between points which are on either side of 1/2 as they approach 1/2, since the agent is relying on their sensory
abilities, which are limited. We thus assume λM goes to infinity as M grows large.
We are interested in the behavior of the agent, and how it changes, on either side of 1/2. Let Pr(1|ti)
denote the probability of the agent accepting the prize given that the dot is in ti. We then desire to show that
|Pr(1|tM )− Pr(1|tM+1)| → 0 as M →∞. We can do this through a simple proof by contradiction. Fix arbitrary
ǫ > 0, and assume that for all M that the optimal behavior of the agent is such that |Pr(1|tM )−Pr(1|tM+1)| > ǫ.
Notice that if the agents strategy is optimal, then it must be that Pr(1|tM ) < Pr(1|tM+1), otherwise the agent
could switch the two choice probabilities and be better off. Thus, Pr(1|tM ) + ǫ < Pr(1|tM+1) for all M .
Suppose instead that the agent changes their strategy such that Pr(1|tM ) and Pr(1|tM+1) are:
P˜r(1|tM ) = P˜r(1|tM+1) =
Pr(1|tM ) + Pr(1|tM+1)
2
.
The agent’s expected prize value would decrease due to this change. Lemma 3 tells us this reduction would be at
most y
M
. The agent would also save on research, however. Lemma 7 and Lemma 3 tell us this saving would be:
λM
M
(
Pr(1|tM ) log Pr(1|tM ) + Pr(1|tM+1) log Pr(1|tM+1)
2
−
Pr(1|tM ) + Pr(1|tM+1)
2
log
(
Pr(1|tM ) + Pr(1|tM+1)
2
))
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+
λM
M
(
Pr(2|tM ) log Pr(2|tM ) + Pr(2|tM+1) log Pr(2|tM+1)
2
−
Pr(2|tM ) + Pr(2|tM+1)
2
log
(
Pr(2|tM ) + Pr(2|tM+1)
2
))
But because Pr(1|tM ) + ǫ < Pr(1|tM+1), there exists δ > 0 such that the savings in research is more than λM δ
M
,
since x log x is strictly convex. Taking M to infinity, we see the benefit, which is more than λM δ
M
, outweighs the
cost, which is less than y
M
, since λM →∞. This contradicts our assertion that the agent’s behavior was optimal,
and we are done.
It is also worth noting that it is important in this environment that behavior near the two end points differ.
With Shannon Entropy, it is possible to get behavior at the mid point that is continuous in the limit by taking
λ to infinity, but this would result in behavior that is the same at either endpoint. This prediction is unlikely to
observed in data if the interval is long enough. With MSSE, following a similar argument as above which uses
Theorem 1 to measure costs instead of Lemma 7, it can be shown behavior at the end points would differ if there
are regions near the end points where increasing M does not increase the multipliers that describe local costs.
Appendix 4
In a setting where there are n possible events, A1, . . . , An, in a stochastic system with known probabil-
ities, Pr(A1), . . .Pr(An), Shannon (1948) seeks to find a measure of the uncertainty about which event occurs:
H(Pr(A1), . . .Pr(An)). Shannon’s (1948) axioms about H are as follow:
Shannon’s Axiom 1: H should be continuous in Pr(Ai) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Shannon’s Axiom 2: If all Ai are equally likely, then H should be a monotonic increasing function of n.
Shannon’s Axiom 3: If the uncertainty about A1, . . . , An can be broken into two parts: uncertainty about one
of two events B1 and B2 such that each of the Ai’s are in exactly one of B1 and B2, then the uncertainty about
A1, . . . , An should be equal to the uncertainty about B1 and B2 plus the expected uncertainty about A1, . . . , An
given the occurrence of B1 or B2:
H(Pr(A1), . . . , Pr(An)) = H(Pr(B1), Pr(B2)) + Pr(B1)H(Pr(A1|B1), . . . , Pr(An|B1))
+Pr(B2)H(Pr(A1|B2), . . . , Pr(An|B2))
where:
Pr(B1) =
∑
Ai∈B1
Pr(Ai), Pr(B2) =
∑
Ai∈B2
Pr(Ai)
and:
Pr(Ai|Bj) = 0 if Ai /∈ Bj , Pr(Ai|Bj) =
Pr(Ai)
Pr(Bj)
if Ai ∈ Bj .
Shannon’s Theorem 2: The only H that satisfies Shannon’s three axioms is of the form:
H(Pr(A1), . . . , Pr(An)) = −K
n∑
i=1
Pr(Ai) log(Pr(Ai)),
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where K is some positive constant.
Appendix 5
The behavior described in Theorem 2 has many intuitive features. It is also a quite natural extension of the
analogous result from Mateˇjka and McKay (2015), which is described in equation (14). If we assume the agent
has prior µ, and all partitions are learning strategy invariant (the environment studied in Mateˇjka and McKay
(2015)) and have associated multiplier λ2, then if the agent does optimal research in state ω ∈ Ω, they select
option n from their set of options N with probability:
Pr(n|ω) =
Pr(n)e
vn(ω)
λ2∑
ν∈N
Pr(ν)e
vν (ω)
λ2
. (14)
One major takeaway from the formula in (14) is that when Shannon Entropy is used to measure uncertainty
the chance of the agent selecting an option n in a particular state of the world ω is fully determined by the
unconditional chances of the options being selected, Pr(n), and the realized values of the options in that state of
the world. Beyond this takeaway, the formula in (14) also has many intuitive features. If λ2 grows, which represents
an increase in the difficulty of learning, the value of each option in the realized state becomes less significant for
the determination of the selected option, and the significance of the agent’s prior increases. Similarly, if λ2
shrinks, the agent’s prior becomes less significant, and the realized values of the options becomes more significant.
If λ2 approaches infinity, the realized values become insignificant, and the behavior of the agent approaches the
behavior of the agent in the case where learning is impossible: they choose their option based on their prior. If
λ2 approaches zero the unconditional priors become insignificant, and the behavior of the agent approaches the
behavior of the agent in the case where learning is costless: they choose the option with the highest realized value.
If we instead assume that the agent may also learn through a partition with a lower multiplier λ1, that
can convey information about the realization Pλ1(ω) of a partition Pλ1 of Ω, then if Pλ1 6= Ω, and the agent does
optimal research in state ω ∈ Ω, they select option n from their set of options N with probability:
Pr(n|ω) =
Pr(n)
λ1
λ2 Pr(n|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λ2 e
vn(ω)
λ2∑
ν∈N
Pr(ν)
λ1
λ2 Pr(ν|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λ2 e
vν (ω)
λ2
. (15)
With MSSE, as the formula in (15) indicates, the chance of the agent selecting an option n in a particular
state of the world ω depends not only on the unconditional chances of the options being selected and the realized
values of the options, but also on the values that the options take in similar states of the world, states that result
in the same realization of Pλ1 . When option n is in general desirable in Pλ1(ω) relative to the other alternatives,
then Pr(n|Pλ1(ω)) is larger, and there may be a high chance of n being selected, even if Pr(n) is not that large,
and vn(ω) is not that high.
The formula in (15) also has many intuitive features. It maintains the intuitive comparative statistics for
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λ2 that the formula in (14) had, and also features intuitive properties for Pr(n|Pλ1(ω)) and λ1. If observing
Pλ1(ω) is completely uninformative about the value of the options, then it is optimal for the agent to select
Pr(n|Pλ1(ω)) = Pr(n) since C
∗ is concave. In this case Pr(n)
λ1
λ2 Pr(n|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λ2 = Pr(n), and behavior is
identical to that in (14). If the cheaper information source contains irrelevant information it is thus ignored, and
behavior collapses back to the environment described in Mateˇjka and McKay (2015), as we should desire. If λ1
approaches λ2 (the cheaper information source becomes close to as expensive as the more expensive information
source) then behavior approaches that described in (14) since Pr(n)
λ1
λ2 Pr(n|Pλ1(ω))
λ2−λ1
λ2 → Pr(n). Thus, if an
insignificantly cheaper information source is introduced behavior is changed in an insignificant fashion. Again,
this seems like a desirable property. If λ1 approaches zero then the role of the unconditional priors dissipates,
and exponent on Pr(n|P(ω)) approaches one, meaning it replaces the unconditional prior from (14). This makes
sense because if λ1 goes to zero it means Pλ1(ω) can essentially be viewed for free, in which case behavior within
each Pλ1(ω) should resemble that in the setting where there is only one information source with multiplier λ2
and a prior of µ(·|Pλ1(ω)).
We can continue adding as many new partitions with new associated multipliers as we desire and the
description of behavior in Theorem 2 maintains the sorts of intuitive properties described in the paragraphs
above. RI with MSSE is thus a very natural extension of RI with Shannon Entropy.
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